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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an Order for Summary Judgment and Dismissal with
Prejudice entered by the Fourth District Court for Utah County, The Honorable Samuel
McVey, Judge, which dismissed a legal malpractice action filed by the Appellant Dr.
Michael H. Jensen ("Dr. Jensen") against Appellee Alan K. Young ("Young"). This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102.
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court correctly rule that Dr. Jensen's purported
legal malpractice claims against Young are barred by the four year statute of limitations
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (renumbered to 78B-2-307(3)) because Dr.
Jensen did not file his claims until at least eight years after the causes of action accrued
and after the undisputed evidence demonstrates he knew of his claims?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision granting summary
judgment for correctness. See, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52, f 9, 167
P.3d 1011.
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Preservation of Issue: Young raised and briefed this issue in his summary
judgment memoranda. [R. 388-180; R. 749-565.]
ISSUE NO. 2: Even if it is assumed for argument that Dr. Jensen's claims are not
barred by the statute of limitations, is Dr. Jensen's claim for economic loss arising out of
the First Broadcast on September 5, 1995, without merit as a matter of law for the
additional reason, not reached by the district court, that the undisputed evidence
demonstrates Young was not retained by Dr. Jensen until sometime after February 6,
1997, many months after Dr. Jensen's claim was barred by the statute of limitations?
Standard of Review: Although the district court did not reach this issue which was
raised by Young on summary judgment, this Court can decide this issue and affirm on any
ground that the district court could have relied upon in granting summary judgment.
Afridi v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins, Co., 2005 UT 53, f 5, 122 P.3d 596, 598.
This Court applies the same standard that the district court would apply, i.e., whether
there is any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the economic loss claim which
precludes summary judgment. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Preservation of Issue: Young raised and briefed this issue in his summary
judgment memoranda. [R. 388-180; R. 749-565.]
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ISSUE NO. 3: Even if it is assumed for argument that Dr. Jensen's claims are not
barred by the statute of limitations, are Dr. Jensen's claims for punitive damages arising
out of the First and Second Broadcasts barred for the additional reason, not reached by the
district court, that this Court's decision in Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325
bars the claims because this Court ruled that there was no proof of actual malice on the
part of KTVX and Sawyers with respect to the Third Broadcast and the statements upon
which Dr. Jensen relies in the First and Second Broadcasts were the same as the
statements in the Third Broadcast?
Standard of Review: Although the district court did not reach this issue which was
raised by Young on summary judgment, this Court can decide this issue and affirm on any
ground that the district court could have relied upon in granting summary judgment. See,
Afridi, supra. This Court applies the same standard that the district court would apply,
i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the economic loss
claim which precludes summary judgment. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Preservation of Issue: Young raised and briefed this issue in his summary
judgment memoranda. [R. 388-180; R. 749-565.]
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III.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (renumbered to 78B-2-307(3)) provides that "An
action may be brought within four years: (3) for relief not otherwise provided by law."
In addition, Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of the issues
presented and is included in the Brief of Appellant.

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Dr. Jensen obtained a judgment against KTVX television station and its reporter,

Mary Sawyers ("Sawyers"), for false light invasion of privacy arising out of three news
reports aired on KTVX in which Sawyers made statements relating to Dr. Jensen's illegal
drug prescriptions for patients (the "Sawyers Case"). This Court reversed in part, holding
that any claims relating to the first and second broadcasts on September 5, 1995, and June
17, 1996, respectively, were barred by the one-year defamation statute of limitations
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (renumbered to 78B-2-302(4)) because the
Sawyers Case was not commenced until June 27, 1997. The Court also reversed all of the

4

economic loss damages relating to the third broadcast on November 6, 1996, because all
such damages had been caused by the first broadcast and were therefore barred by the
statute of limitations. Finally, the Court reversed the punitive damage award relating to
the third broadcast on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to prove actual malice.
On February 7, 2007, approximately 10 years after the alleged malpractice
occurred, Dr. Jensen then commenced this action against Young, who initially
represented Dr. Jensen in the Sawyers Case. Dr. Jensen alleges that Young committed
malpractice by failing to commence the action within one year after the first broadcast,
i.e., by September 5, 1996, or within one year after the second broadcast, i.e., by June 17,
1997.
After conducting discovery, Young filed a motion for summary judgment on three
grounds. First, all claims against Young are barred by the four year statute of limitations
for legal malpractice because this action was not filed until February 7, 2007, almost ten
years after the last act of alleged malpractice occurred and eight years after Dr. Jensen
undeniably knew of the alleged malpractice. Second, the undisputed evidence
demonstrates that Dr. Jensen did not retain Young to represent him in this action until
sometime after February 6, 1997, when Dr. Jensen wrote a letter to Young acknowledging
that Young had not yet agreed to represent him. Dr. Jensen's claim for economic loss
5

relating to the first broadcast, which, as this Court ruled, caused all of Dr. Jensen's alleged
economic loss damages, was barred by September 5, 1996, many months before Dr.
Jensen retained Young. Third, Dr. Jensen's punitive damage claims relating to the First
and Second Broadcasts are barred by this Court's decision that there was no proof of
actual malice by KTVX and Sawyers.
On July 22, 2008, the district court granted summary judgment on the basis that the
malpractice claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The district court did not
reach the other two grounds of the summary judgment motion. Summary judgment was
entered on July 23, 2008. [R. 947.] Dr. Jensen timely filed this appeal on August 21,
2008. [R.95L]
B.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Geoff Goff ("Goff'), an executive producer for KTVX, met Dr. Jensen at a

Fourth of July party in 1995 given by a mutual friend, a Ms. Johnson. Ms. Johnson
remarked that she had to exercise all the time because her job required her to eat out so
frequently. In response, Dr. Jensen offered to prescribe her diet drugs - amphetamines which he explained to Ms. Johnson were an easy and effective way to lose weight. Ms.
Johnson did not express any interest in his offer, but Dr. Jensen nevertheless persisted and
wrote a prescription, giving it to Ms. Johnson without taking any medical history or
6

making any appointment with her for a physical examination. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005
UT 81, If 2, 130 P.3d 325, 328 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A). [R.
385-384,f 1.]
2.

Both Goff and Ms. Johnson believed that Dr. Jensen may have acted

unethically in providing the prescription to a patient he had not examined. Goff believed
at that point that there may be a news story. [R. 384, ^f 2.]
3.

The next day, Goff wrote down what had happened at the party and gave it

to KTVX medical affairs reporter, Sawyers, so she could look into the story. [R. 384, ^f
3.]
4.

Sawyers called Dr. Jensen and explained to him that she was a reporter at

KTVX and that Goff had referred her to Dr. Jensen as someone who could help her lose
weight and asked if he could prescribe diet pills for her. Dr. Jensen replied that he
probably could but that he would need to see her in person to prescribe diet pills and that
although many physicians were reluctant to prescribe prescription diet pills, he was not
reluctant. Dr. Jensen further told her that "[traditionally what has been used is
Dexedrine" but "Dexedrine is technically illegal to . . . use as a diet pill" although
sometimes he finds other disorders that he "felt comfortable using Dexedrine with." [R.
384-383,14.]
7

5.

Sawyers made an appointment to see Dr. Jensen and posed as a patient. She

recorded her visit with a hidden camera. During the examination, Sawyers explained to
Dr. Jensen that she was there to obtain the safest, easiest way to lose weight. Dr. Jensen
explained that Fastin and Pondimin were at the time the most commonly prescribed
prescription medications for weight loss, but if they did not work "I would be willing to
work with you . . . maybe using Dexedrine." Dr. Jensen repeated his earlier comment that
prescribing Dexedrine for weight loss was illegal. Dr. Jensen also told Sawyers that if
Fastin was wearing off and she needed something to pick her up she could bite a small
amount of the capsule as a means of breaking the time release form of the drug although
doing so was considered a misuse of the drug. [R. 383, f 5.]
6.

During Sawyers's appointment, Dr. Jensen did not obtain a complete

medical history of her, nor did he conduct a physical examination or ask her if she was
taking any medication. Sawyers was not overweight or obese, and she was not weighed
by Dr. Jensen or his staff. [R. 383,16.]
7.

Based upon her visit, Sawyers and KTVX aired three news reports

concerning Dr. Jensen on September 5, 1995 (the "First Broadcast'5); June 17, 1996 (the
"Second Broadcast"); and November 6, 1996 (the "Third Broadcast"). [R. 382,17.]
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8.

On September 6, 1995, the very next day after the First Broadcast,

Columbia FirstMed terminated Dr. Jensen's employment and Mountain View Hospital in
Utah County revoked Dr. Jensen's privileges to practice medicine at the hospital. IHC
Health Plans also removed Dr. Jensen from its insurance panel due to his
"unprofessional" and "possibly illegal" conduct that it believed had been disclosed in the
First Broadcast. [R. 382, | 8.]
9.

Dr. Jensen claims that shortly after the First Broadcast, he spoke with

Young at the Art City Family Medical Center where Dr. Jensen worked and that Young
offered his services. [R. 382,19.]
10.

Dr. Jensen claims that on September 11, 1995, he called Young's law

office, although Dr. Jensen had no recollection of the call, who he spoke with or what was
said. Dr. Jensen's phone records indicate the call was one minute or less. [R. 382, ^ 10.]
11.

The day after the First Broadcast, the Department of Professional Licensing

("DOPL") began an investigation of Dr. Jensen, and an investigator showed up at his
clinic. Dr. Jensen retained attorney Max Wheeler to represent him in connection with the
DOPL investigation soon after the First Broadcast. [R. 382-381, % 11.]
12.

Dr. Jensen claims that within two or three weeks after September 5, 1995,

he met with Young at his law office. According to Dr. Jensen, Young was shown a tape
9

of the First Broadcast and told Dr. Jensen that he thought Dr. Jensen had a big money
lawsuit and that Young liked the lawsuit. Dr. Jensen claims that Young said he was
willing to take the lawsuit but he wanted to see what the DOPL investigation of Dr.
Jensen showed. According to Dr. Jensen, Young stated, "I need to know whether you are
a good guy or a bad guy, and then we can proceed." Dr. Jensen also claims that Young
"said the case would be worth a lot of money" and that he had done well in a "big case"
involving Geneva steel. Dr. Jensen recalled nothing more about the meeting. Dr. Jensen
did not sign a retainer agreement with Young at that time. The next contact that Dr.
Jensen can recall having with Young was over a year thereafter. [R. 381, ^j 12.]
13.

Dr. Jensen's phone records do not disclose a single telephone call with

Young after the alleged first meeting until April 1997. Moreover, Dr. Jensen's calendars
do not contain a single reference to any meeting or telephone call with Young until April
9,1997, when Dr. Jensen signed a retainer agreement. [R. 381-380, % 13.]
14.

Nevertheless, Dr. Jensen now claims that as of the date of the alleged first

meeting he considered Young to be his lawyer because Young "had told me he wanted
the case, that he was just waiting for me to get through the DOPL thing." [R. 380, ^ 14.]
15.

DOPL filed a petition against Dr. Jensen on June 12, 1996, nine months

after the First Broadcast, alleging that his treatment of Sawyers violated the Utah
10

Administrative Code and that Dr. Jensen had engaged in unprofessional conduct. [R.
38051|15.]
16.

Dr. Jensen entered into an agreement with DOPL on October 30,1996

(more than a year after the First Broadcast), pursuant to which the DOPL investigation
was resolved and Dr. Jensen agreed to a public reprimand and to various other conditions,
including meeting with the board quarterly and taking courses on ethics and controlled
and dangerous substances. [R. 380, f 16.]
17.

On October 4, 1995, approximately one month after the First Broadcast, Dr.

Jensen testified he met with Provo attorney Jackson Howard to solicit him to take Dr.
Jensen's case and evaluate his tort claims. [R. 380, <[ 17.]
18.

Sometime after June 12, 1996, and before July 8, 1996, Dr. Jensen wrote

Jackson Howard a letter in which he set forth some of his contentions regarding the First
Broadcast. In that letter, he stated: "I would say I need legal advise [sic]. It would appear
the state and channel 4 have also made themselves more liable." [R. 379, f 18.]
19.

In another letter, Dr. Jensen wrote to his DOPL lawyer, Max Wheeler, some

time between June and October 1996, requesting that Wheeler provide advice as to how
comments made by DOPL concerning the First Broadcast could be used to Dr. Jensen's
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advantage. Immediately after this request, Dr. Jensen wrote: "I'll ask Jackson this too."
[R. 379,119.]
20.

Dr. Jensen met with Howard again on July 8, 1996, after the Second

Broadcast. Dr. Jensen sent his DOPL lawyer a letter in which Dr. Jensen stated that Mr.
Howard had agreed to take the case.1 This letter was sent before the statute of limitations
expired on the First Broadcast because (a) the letter includes a draft answer to the petition
that DOPL filed against Dr. Jensen on June 12, 1996, and (b) Dr. Jensen's answer was
filed on July 11, 1996. [R. 379, f 20.]
21.

The week prior to September 27, 1996, Dr. Jensen met with Charles H.

Thronson, a lawyer with Parsons Behle & Latimer, to discuss Dr. Jensen's case against
KTVX and Sawyers. On September 27, 1996, attorney Thronson sent Dr. Jensen a letter
in which he declined to take Dr. Jensen's case principally because of the problem with the
statute of limitations. Specifically, Thronson wrote:
As I mentioned to you, the firm has a personal injury
committee, which needs to consider whether or not to
undertake specific litigation. I reviewed all of the information
that you provided to me, including the documents and the
1

Dr. Jensen testified that Howard was interested in filing a claim against the state
representative for violation of Dr. Jensen's constitutional rights and not a tort claim
against Channel 4 and Sawyers. Dr. Jensen decided he did not want to sue the State. [R.
379, n. 1.]
12

videotape with the committee. Unfortunately, primarily
related to the statute of limitations questions which you and I
discussed, the committee made the decision that the firm is
not able at this time to undertake the litigation.
[R. 378,121.]
22.

After the alleged first meeting with Young two or three weeks after the First

Broadcast, the next time Dr. Jensen can recall contacting Young was after the Third
Broadcast, which occurred on November 6,1996, when Dr. Jensen sent Young a letter
dated November 12, 1996, with a tape of the Third Broadcast.2 Young allegedly said that
"we shouldn't sit on this any longer, the third newscast is inflammatory and that we need
to file a complaint." [R. 378-377,1f 22.]
23.

On January 27, 1997, Young sent Dr. Jensen a letter in which he stated:
Dear Dr. Jensen:
You have advised me that you will obtain the records or a
letter from the state investigation for me. If you could get me
that information, I can make a determination with regard to
taking your case.

Dr. Jensen understood that Young "wanted to see that the State's conclusions about me
were completed" and "that the state was no longer going after me." Dr. Jensen

2

Dr. Jensen speculated that he may have met with Young again after the June 17, 1996
Second Broadcast, but he did not have any recollection of such a meeting. [R. 377, n. 2.]
13

understood that this predicate did not occur until sometime after his agreement was
signed with the State of Utah on October 30,1996, and after Young's January 27, 1997
letter. [R. 377, If 23.]
24.

Dr. Jensen does not recall any conversation with Young prior to January 27,

1997, in which he and Young had agreed how Young would be paid for his services. [R.
377,124.]
25.

The next meeting that Dr. Jensen can identify with Young allegedly

occurred within two or three months after the Third Broadcast. [R. 376,125.]
26.

On February 6, 1997, more than a year and five months after the First

Broadcast, and more than four months after attorney Thronson had turned down his case,
Dr. Jensen wrote a letter to Young in which Dr. Jensen discussed events with respect to
the DOPL complaint, informed Young of the dates of the three KTVX broadcasts and
stated:
Allen / realize you have not yet accepted this case. But I do
appreciate your interest so far. I am committed to pursuing
tort issues, as I think my ability to help people as a doctor has
in many ways been ruined by faund [sic] and slander,
interestingly, so our friends at Channel 4 can sell
commercials. I am hopeful a careful approach will pay off
with the State until my next scheduled meeting with the
Board. At that point, it's my intention to take a more assertive
approach. [Emphasis added.]
14

[R. 376,f 26.]
27.

On April 9, 1997, Dr. Jensen signed a fee agreement by which he retained

Young to represent him in filing suit against KTVX and Sawyers. [R. 376, 1 27.]
28.

Young filed a complaint on Dr. Jensen's behalf against KTVX and Sawyers

on June 27, 1997. The original complaint filed by Young asserted claims for defamation
arising out of the three broadcasts. [R. 375,128.]
29.

Young formally withdrew as Dr. Jensen's attorney on January 28, 1999. On

December 30, 1998, Dr. Jensen signed a written retainer agreement in which he agreed to
retain Dale F. Gardiner ("Gardiner") and agreed to pay Gardiner a fee of $120.00 per
hour plus a percentage of any recovery. [R. 375,129 and R. 897 and 891.]
30.

After Young withdrew and Gardiner took over as Jensen's lawyer, KTVX

and Sawyers filed a motion for summary judgment on Dr. Jensen's defamation claims
relating to the First and Second Broadcasts, alleging they were barred by the one-year
statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (renumbered to 78B-2302(4)). [R. 375,130.]
31.

Dr. Jensen responded to the statute of limitations defenses by seeking

permission to amend his complaint to add claims, including false light invasion of privacy
claims. The trial court granted summary judgment on the defamation claims on April 22,
15

1999, and permitted Dr. Jensen to amend his complaint. [R. 714-713.] The trial court
also dismissed Dr. Jensen's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. [R. 713.]
Jensen admits he knew of this ruling in April 1999, knew that he had lost his defamation
claims and knew he had been "disadvantaged." [R. 375, f 31.]
32.

Early in 1999, Gardiner performed substantial services on behalf of Dr.

Jensen in opposing the motion for summary judgment filed by Sawyers and KTVX to
dismiss the defamation claims on the basis they were barred by the statute of limitations.
Gardiner also performed substantial services in successfully moving to amend the
complaint to assert invasion of privacy claims to mitigate the damages arising from the
dismissal of the defamation claims. Gardiner testified that as of February 17, 1999, Dr.
Jensen had paid him $14,228.23 for his work and that the biggest part of those fees was
for Gardiner's work in responding to the motion to dismiss the defamation claims on the
statute of limitations grounds. Part of the fee was also for work done to seek leave to
amend to add invasion of privacy claims. Thereafter, Dr. Jensen was billed and paid at
least $1,250 more relating to the defamation motion and the motion to amend. [R. 897895 and R. 888-861.]
33.

Within 30 days after the defamation claims were dismissed on April 22,

1999, Gardiner met with Dr. Jensen. Dr. Jensen understood he had been damaged by the
16

loss of his defamation claims. At that time Dr. Jensen discussed with Gardiner suing
Young for legal malpractice for not timely filing the defamation claims. Dr. Jensen stated
that he believed he had a malpractice claim against Young because Young's failure to act
resulted in the loss of the defamation claims. Gardiner testified he told Dr. Jensen that he
had made the decision that he would not personally sue other lawyers and that Dr. Jensen
would have to get another lawyer to sue Young. Dr. Jensen said that he would talk to
Young and others about filing a malpractice case. Dr. Jensen had not made up his mind
whether he was going to sue Young. Gardiner had similar conversations with Dr. Jensen
about filing a malpractice claim against Young three of four other times. (Id.)
34.

Although the trial court granted Dr. Jensen's motion to amend to assert the

invasion of privacy claims to mitigate damages resulting from loss of the defamation
claims, Gardiner understood that on a de novo review of the statute, the Utah Supreme
Court may well rule that those claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations
applicable to defamation claims and he so informed Dr. Jensen. Even though the trial
court allowed amendment, Dr. Jensen knew that the defamation claims had been lost and
that was why he was considering suing Young for malpractice. At no time did Gardiner
assure Dr. Jensen that the false light claims would fix whatever damage was done to him
as a result of the dismissal of his defamation claims. (Id.)
17

35.

The jury returned a verdict for Dr. Jensen against KTVX and Sawyers for

false light invasion of privacy on the First and Second Broadcasts and awarded him
$520,000.00 in economic loss damages, $85,000.00 in general damages, and $245,300.00
in punitive damages. The jury also returned a verdict for Dr. Jensen on the Third
Broadcast for false light invasion of privacy and defamation, awarding him $1 million for
economic loss, $500,000.00 in general damages and $450,600.00 in punitive damages.
[R. 375-374, % 32.]
36.

Final judgment in the Sawyers Case was entered October 25, 2001, after

which time Dr. Jensen had thirty days to appeal the dismissal of the defamation claims.
Dr. Jensen filed no appeal regarding the dismissal of the defamation claims. [R. 374, f
33.]
37.

The Supreme Court ruled that Dr. Jensen's claims for false light invasion of

privacy on the First and Second Broadcasts were barred by the one year defamation
statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (renumbered to 78B-2302(4)). The Court further reversed the $1 million economic loss award relating to the
Third Broadcast, ruling that there was no evidence to support that award because the
evidence demonstrated that all of Dr. Jensen's economic loss was caused by the First
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Broadcast. The Court also ruled that there was no evidence of actual malice with respect
to the Third Broadcast and therefore reversed the punitive damage award. [R. 374,134.]
38.

Dr. Jensen filed his complaint in the present action on February 7, 2007.

[R. 374?]f 35 and R. 8.]
V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court correctly held that Dr. Jensen's malpractice claims are barred by
the four year statute of limitations which began to run upon the occurrence of the last
event required to form the elements of the cause of action when Young allegedly failed to
timely file the claim relating to the First Broadcast by September 4, 1996 and failed to file
the claim relating to the Second Broadcast by June 16,1997, or at the latest when the
defamation claims were dismissed and attorneys' fees incurred as a result of the alleged
malpractice in 1999. Dr. Jensen did not file his present lawsuit until February 7, 2007,
approximately ten years after the statute of limitations expired on his defamation claims
and at least eight years after the statute of limitations commenced on his malpractice
claims against Young.
Dr. Jensen attempts to avoid the statute of limitations by arguing that the discovery
rule should be applied to toll the statute until this Court issued its decision in the Sawyers
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Case on November 15, 2005. Dr. Jensen mistakenly argues that special circumstances
exist because until that time he did not know, and could not have known, that he had been
damaged by the alleged malpractice as the trial court in the Sawyers Case had permitted
him to amend his complaint to allege false light invasion of privacy at the same time that
his defamation claims were dismissed and the jury had awarded him a multi-million
dollar verdict on the false light claims. This argument is without merit and was correctly
rejected by the district court.
Contrary to what Dr. Jensen argues, the undisputed evidence below demonstrated
that he knew of the alleged malpractice in 1997 and knew the defamation claims had been
dismissed on April 22, 1999, or shortly thereafter, and that he had been "disadvantaged"
by the dismissal. Dr. Jensen's attorney conceded below that Dr. Jensen knew he had been
damaged by that time and only argued the statute of limitations should not commence
until Dr. Jensen knew the full extent of his damages.
In fact, it was undisputed that after Young withdrew as his counsel Dr. Jensen
repeatedly had discussions with his new attorney, Gardiner, about suing Young and was
told that Gardiner would not sue another attorney and that Dr. Jensen would have to
obtain other counsel to do so. It was also undisputed that Gardiner advised Dr. Jensen
that the Supreme Court, in reviewing the statute of limitations issue de novo, may well
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reverse the trial court's decision and hold that Dr. Jensen's false light claims were barred
by the one year defamation statute of limitations. Gardiner never assured Dr. Jensen that
the filing of the false light claims would remedy the damages caused by the dismissal of
his defamation claims. Finally, it was undisputed below that as a result of Young's
alleged malpractice, Dr. Jensen incurred damages of at least $15,000 in early 1999 in
defending against dismissal of his defamation claims and obtaining permission to amend
his complaint to assert the false light claims.
Thus, the fact of Dr. Jensen's damages was certain back in 1997, but at least by
1999. The only uncertainty was the amount of damages. Therefore, as a matter of law,
the discovery rule is inapplicable because at least by 1999 Dr. Jensen knew of his
malpractice claims against Young and that he had been damaged by Young's alleged
malpractice. At the latest time he discovered his alleged claims, Dr. Jensen still had over
16 months to file his alleged malpractice claim relating to the First Broadcast and over
two years to file his alleged malpractice claim relating to the Second Broadcast.
Because the special circumstances exception cannot otherwise be applied, it is not
necessary to balance the hardships. However, if a balancing analysis were performed, the
hardships clearly favor Young. Dr. Jensen's eight year delay in filing suit substantially
prejudiced Young's ability to defend this case because of a lack of records and fading
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memories. The only prejudice that Dr. Jensen has pointed to is that his claims would be
barred if the statute of limitations is applied, which is the normal result of applying the
statute of limitations.
Even if it were assumed for argument that Dr. Jensen's claims are not barred by
the statute of limitations, Dr. Jensen's economic loss and punitive damage claims are
without merit and should be dismissed for two additional reasons not reached by the
district court. This Court can affirm on any basis that the district court could have
granted summary judgment.
First, this Court ruled in the Sawyers Case that all of Dr. Jensen's economic loss
was suffered as a result of the First Broadcast. The undisputed evidence demonstrated
below that Dr. Jensen did not retain Young to represent him until months after the statute
of limitations on the claim relating to the First Broadcast had expired. Indeed, Dr.
Jensen's contact with Young prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation was limited
to a telephone call of one minute or less and one alleged meeting in September 1995
during which Dr. Jensen admits that Young told him that he wanted to await the results of
the DOPL investigation before deciding whether to take the case. After that meeting, Dr.
Jensen met with two other attorneys to attempt to get them to take his case and
acknowledged in February 1997 that Young had not yet agreed to take the case.
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Second, Dr. Jensen's claims for punitive damages are barred by this Court's
decision in the Sawyers Case that no actual malice relating to the Third Broadcast was
proven because Dr. Jensen relies upon the same statements made in the First and Second
Broadcasts that were repeated in the Third Broadcast and which this Court has held were
insufficient to demonstrate actual malice.
VI.
ARGUMENT
A.

DR. JENSEN'S MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The district court correctly held that Dr. Jensen's malpractice claims against

Young are barred by the statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3)
(renumbered to 78B-2-307(3)) "for relief not otherwise provided for by law". The statute
of limitations on a legal malpractice claim "begins to run upon the occurrence of the last
event required to form the elements of the cause of action." Williams v. Howard, 970
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1998). The statute of limitations for Dr. Jensen's defamation
claims was one year as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (renumbered to 78B2-302(4)). Dr. Jensen lost his defamation claims when Young allegedly failed to timely
file the claim relating to the First Broadcast by September 4, 1996, and failed to file the
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claim relating to the Second Broadcast by June 16, 1997.3 Dr. Jensen's claims against
Young accrued at that time and the statute of limitations commenced running. The very
latest date the claims could have accrued and the statute of limitations commenced was
April 22, 1999, when the defamation claims were dismissed in the Sawyers Case and Dr.
Jensen had incurred substantial attorneys' fees as a result of the alleged malpractice.4
Williams, 970 P.2d at 1284. Dr. Jensen did not file the present suit until February 7,
2007, approximately ten years after his defamation claims were barred by the statute of
limitations and eight years after the defamation claims were dismissed. Consequently,
Dr. Jensen's malpractice claims are barred by the four year statute of limitations.
1.

The Special Circumstances Prong of the Discovery Rule Cannot Be
Applied Because Dr. Jensen Knew of the Alleged Malpractice and that
He Had Been Damaged Back in 1997 and 1999,

In his brief, Dr. Jensen argues incorrectly that the discovery rule should be applied to
toll the statute of limitations until this Court issued its decision in the underlying Sawyers
Case on November 15, 2005, because special circumstances supposedly exist that render
the application of the normal statute of limitations rule that the statute begins to run when
the legal malpractice is committed unjust and irrational. The only "special circumstance"
3

For purposes of this argument only, Young is assuming that Young was retained within
a year after the First Broadcast, though, as demonstrated below, that did not occur.

4

Dr. Jensen did not appeal the dismissal of the defamation claims.
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pointed to by Dr. Jensen is that he supposedly could not have known and did not know
that he had a cause of action against Young for malpractice until this Court reversed his
jury verdict and that prior to that time any damages were too remote and speculative
where his "claims against KTVX were seemingly successfully amended to an alternative
tort theory." [Aplt's Br. at pp. 17-27.] Dr. Jensen ignores the record by arguing that as an
untrained layman he could not possibly have understood he was damaged before this
Court ruled in the Sawyers Case in 2005. This argument finds no support in the law and
is simply not faithful to the record below.
The special circumstances rule is reserved "for 'more egregious circumstances.'
[C]ourts should be cautious in tolling a statute of limitations, liberal tolling could
potentially cause greater hardships than it would ultimately relieve." Grynberg v. Questar
Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, f 65-66, 70 P.3d. 1,17. The rule can only be applied where the
plaintiff did not and could not have discovered the claim prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations and it would be 'truly 'irrational' or 'unjust' to apply a statute of
limitations." Id.
In Williams, supra, the trial court had denied the Defendant attorney's motion for
summary judgment on the basis of the four year statute of limitations, holding that the
discovery rule applied and that the suit was filed within four years of discovery of the
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malpractice. This Court reversed, holding that the statute of limitations commenced when
the attorney failed to timely file the client's claim. The Court applied the traditional rule
as to the applicability of the discovery rule:
There are three situations in which we have determined that
application of the discovery rule is appropriate: (1) where the
application of the rule is mandated by statute; (2) where a
plaintiff is unaware of a cause of action because of the
defendant's misleading conduct or concealment; and (3)
where application is warranted by the existence of special
circumstances that would, based on a balancing test, render
application of the statute of limitations unjust or irrational.
»7//iflifw,970P.2datl285.
The Williams Court held that the discovery rule was inapplicable in the face of claimed
special circumstances because the client was informed of the malpractice and could have
filed a malpractice suit before expiration of the normal statute of limitations.
In Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, \ 19, 156 P.3d
806, 812, this Court reiterated its holding in Williams, stating "for this [special
circumstances] exception to apply, 'an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did
not know and could not have reasonably discovered the facts underlying the cause of
action in time to commence an action within [the limitations period]/" [Footnote omitted.]
See also Beaver County v. Prop. Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm % 2006 UT 6,132,
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128 P.3d 1187, 1194; Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, ffl 8-9, 979 P.2d 823, 824; Warren v.
Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1144 (Utah 1992).
The discovery rule cannot be applied in the present case because the undisputed
evidence demonstrates Dr. Jensen knew of his malpractice claims and could have
commenced suit long before the normal statute of limitations expired. According to Dr.
Jensen's own story, shortly after the original complaint was filed against KTVX in 1997,
Young informed him that Young had "blown" the statute with respect to the First and
Second Broadcasts. [Aplt.'s Br. at p. 12.]5 Further, Dr. Jensen admittedly knew of the
alleged malpractice at the latest when the district court dismissed the defamation claims
relating to the First and Second Broadcasts on April 22, 1999. He testified that, in fact, he
knew of the malpractice at that time and knew he had been "disadvantaged." [SOF No.
31.] Indeed, during oral argument below, Dr. Jensen's attorney conceded that Dr. Jensen
5

Dr. Jensen argued below that Young concealed his malpractice by telling Dr. Jensen that
although he had "blown" the statute of limitations on the defamation claim Young was
going after fraud, which claim was not affected by the statute of limitations problem and
that this statement constituted misleading conduct or concealment, which was a ground
for applying the discovery rule. Dr. Jensen has understandably abandoned this meritless
argument on appeal. For purposes of argument, taking Dr. Jensen's testimony on its face,
he knew there had been malpractice, he knew that it was an issue, but understood that
Young was attempting to mitigate by asserting claims of fraud. Most fundamentally, Dr.
Jensen's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims against Sawyers and KTVX were
dismissed by the trial court on April 22, 1999, at the same time that the defamation claims
were dismissed. [SOF No. 31.] Thus, Dr. Jensen could not have been relying on his
fraud claims for recovery after that date.
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knew back in 1999 and before that Young "had blown . . . two statutes of limitation" and
that Dr. Jensen "could have sued Mr. Young." [R. 958 at p. 25.] Counsel stated the issue
was whether the statute of limitations commenced before Dr. Jensen knew the "extent of
the damages." [Id.]
Moreover, Dr. Jensen's new attorney, Gardiner, who replaced Young, testified he
had conversations with Dr. Jensen shortly after the defamation claims were dismissed in
April 1999, in which Dr. Jensen acknowledged and understood he had been damaged by
the loss of his defamation claims. Dr. Jensen discussed with Gardiner suing Young for
legal malpractice for not timely filing the claims and told Gardiner he believed he had a
malpractice claim against Young. Gardiner told Dr. Jensen he would not personally sue
other lawyers. Dr. Jensen said he would talk to Young and others about filing a
malpractice case but that Dr. Jensen had not made up his mind whether he was going to
sue Young. Gardiner testified he had similar conversations with Dr. Jensen about filing a
malpractice claim against Young approximately three or four other times. [SOF No. 33.]
Gardiner testified that he understood that although the trial court had allowed Dr.
Jensen to amend to assert invasion of privacy claims to mitigate damages resulting from
the loss of the defamation claims, this Court may well rule on a de novo review of the
statute that those claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations applicable to
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defamation claims and that he so informed Dr. Jensen. [SOF No. 34.] At no time did
Gardiner tell Dr. Jensen that the false light claims would fix whatever damage was done to
him as a result of the dismissal of the defamation claims. [SOF No. 34.]6 Gardiner's
testimony is not surprising (nor is it contradicted by Dr. Jensen). As this Court noted in
the Sawyers Case: "The operative facts of his false light invasion of privacy claims
alleged defamation. In fact, they are the same facts he pleaded under his defamation
causes of action that were dismissed as untimely." Jensen 2005 UT 81 at ^f 49. Thus, this
Court ruled that Dr. Jensen's claims must be "classified as defamation claims." Id. at ^f 34.
Indeed, this Court's decision in Jensen v. Sawyers that the one-year defamation
statute of limitations applied to Dr. Jensen's false light claims that he was defamed was
foretold by the Court's earlier decision in Russell v. Thomson Newspapers Inc., 842 P.2d
896 (Utah 1992), which was decided three years before the First Broadcast. In Russell the
Court held that Utah's statutory "fair report" privilege applicable to allegations of
defamation extended to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon
the same operative facts that gave rise to the defamation claims. Id. at 902-903. The
Russell Court supported its holding by citing with approval cases in other states applying

6

Notably, Dr. Jensen never testified below why he decided not to sue Young back in
1999. Counsel's implicit argument that he did not do so because the Sawyers Case had
not been decided is mere speculation unsupported by any evidence.
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shorter statutes of limitations for defamation and libel to causes of action for false light
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon defamatory
statements. Id. at 906, n. 37. And, in Jensen v. Sawyers, the Supreme Court noted that the
cases that it relied upon in Russell:
. . . to buttress the merits of applying the fair report privilege to
a cause of action closely allied to defamation are equally
persuasive for the actual proposition they advanced: that the
statute of limitations for defamation governs the claims based
on the same operative facts that would support a defamation
action.
2005 UT 81 at 153.
Moreover, Dr. Jensen knew he was damaged not only by loss of the defamation
claims but by the money spent in opposing the motion to dismiss those claims and
obtaining permission to allege the false light claims. Dr. Jensen incurred approximately
$15,000 in fees in early 1999 in opposing the dismissal of the defamation claims and
obtaining permission to amend his complaint to allege the false light claims. [SOF No.
32.] This damage alone was sufficient to trigger the commencement of the statute of
limitations.
Thus, the discovery rule is inapplicable because back in 1999 when Dr. Jensen
clearly knew at the latest that he had been damaged both by the loss of his defamation
claims and the attorneys fees he incurred in fighting dismissal he still had well over sixteen
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months to file his alleged malpractice claim relating to the First Broadcast and over two
years to file his alleged malpractice claim relating to the Second Broadcast.
These facts are not disputed and Dr. Jensen does not really argue that he did not
know he had been damaged at least by 1999. Instead, he insists the statute should not
commence until he knew the full extent of his damages. Dr. Jensen has been unable to cite
a single case where a court has held that the statute of limitations does not commence
running until a plaintiff knows the full extent of his injuries. Certainly, that is not the law
in Utah. A cause of action accrues when injury is inflicted, not when the amount of
damages is later determined or when all damages are incurred and known. See, e.g.,
Jepson v. State Dep't of Corrections, 846 P.2d 485, 488 (Utah App. 1993) ("[W]e
conclude that Jepson's cause of action against the State accrued on the date of the
accident. At that point, Jepson had sustained injury to support a cause of action,
irrespective of whether 6the full extent of damages had been ascertained... ."').
For example, in Cedar Prof I Plaza LC v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App. 36, f
14, 131 P.3d 275, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment dismissing the
complaint for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act, rejecting the plaintiffs argument that it did not know of its claim within the
statute of limitations. The Court ruled that the plaintiff "was not entitled to wait until it
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knew all of the facts supporting its negligence claim/' but it was enough that the plaintiff
was aware that the defendant's "action or inaction had resulted in some kind of harm to its
interest/' quoting from Bank One Utah NA v. West Jordan City, 2002 UT App. 271, f 12,
54P.3dl35.
In Williams v. Howard, supra, this Court held that the statute commenced running
when the malpractice occurred even though the plaintiff still had a claim against the
manufacturer of the defective water meter cover, by which claim the plaintiff could have
mitigated some or all of his damages. See also Armstrong v. McMurray, 2005 UT App 88
(applying Williams)', Schwinn v. Cook, 2004 UT App 372 (same).
Similarly, in Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 931 P.2d 840, 843-844 (Utah 1996),
a case upon which Dr. Jensen placed significant weight below, a malpractice claim was
barred by the statute of limitations under District of Columbia law because the statute
began running when the client incurred $7,235 in additional legal fees as a result of the
attorney's alleged malpractice in applying for an FTC television station license to attempt
to avoid the harm caused by the malpractice, not when the FTC later denied the television
station license, (citing Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232 (D.C. 1989)).
And, in Brown v. Behles & Davis, 86 P.3d 605, 608 (N.M. App. 2004), the court
held that the malpractice cause of action accrued at the date of the alleged malpractice
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when the plaintiffs lost the right to avoid liens on their property through a bankruptcy
proceeding and not years later when the Tenth Circuit reversed the avoidance of the liens,
explaining:
A party sustains actual injury when the alleged malpractice
'results in the loss of a right, remedy or interest, or in the
imposition of a liability... regardless of whether future
events may affect the permanency of the injury or the amount
of monetary damages eventually incurred.9
Accord, Burtoffv. Faris, 935 A.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C.C.A. 2007) ("\ .. a claim for legal
malpractice accrues when the plaintiff has sustained some injury, even if the injury occurs
prior to the time at which the precise amount of damage can be ascertained.'"); Huff v.
Roach, 106 P.3d 268, 270 (Wash. App. 2005) (clients were damaged when the attorney
missed the statute of limitations in the underlying case, "effectively invading their legal
interests" and therefore the malpractice statute of limitations commenced running at that
time and not later when the statute of limitations was raised as a defense in the underlying
action). Fritzeen v. Gravel, 830 A.2d 49, 53-54 (Vt. 2003); Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 18 CulA* 739, 744 (1998); Basinger v. Sullivan, 540
N.E.2d 91, 93 (Ind. App. 1989) (... to commence the running of the statute of limitations,
it is not necessary that the extent of the damage be known or ascertainable but only that
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damage has occurred."); Cantu v. St. Paul Companies, 514 N.E.2d 666, 668 (Mass.
1987).
Finally, in Vansickle v. Kohout, 599 S.E.2d 856, 857-860 (W.Va. 2004), an
attorney missed a deadline for appealing a worker's compensation decision. The client
hired a new attorney to attempt to mitigate damages by pursuing appeals. The court held
that the statute of limitations commenced running at the time of the malpractice and was
not tolled during the time appeals were being pursued to mitigate the damages. See also
Janicki Logging & Const Co., Inc. v. Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., 37 P.3d 309,
313 (Wash. App. 2001).
Dr. Jensen cites Wagner v. Sellinger, 847 A.2d 1151, 1156 (D.C. 2004) for the
proposition that "[w]here the injury caused by legal malpractice is only materialized by an
adverse judgment against the injured party in the underlying matter, any injury is too
speculative or remote for the party to ascertain prior to that final judgment." Wagner is
easily distinguished. That case did not involve a statute of limitations and plaintiffs
suffered no injury at all until they lost their medical malpractice lawsuit because of the
defendant attorney's malpractice in that lawsuit. The court recognized, however, that "the
plaintiff need not be fully informed about the injury for the statute to begin running; she
need only have some knowledge of some injury." Id. at 1154. [Emphasis added.]
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I he other cases cited by Dr. Jensen in his brief in this regard [see Aplt's Br. at 2023] all involve the same situation where no damage whatsoever had been sustained before
the resolution of the underlying case in which the malpractice was committed For

i Ipp 1998), 'the court held that the malpractice action against 'the law firm was premature
because no actual damages had been suffered, but instead damages were a mere
potentiality. I he court acknowledged, how evei 9 that damages ai e oiil) speculati v e

damages...."

Id. at 478. [Emphasis added.]

The court also recognized that where an attorney's negligence is a direct cause of '
legal expenses muim, ill In llic plauilill lliusi1 alloinns Ices an; damages w hirh are
sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations, citing the court's prior
decision .-:. Got >.•• Giieherman, 659 N.E.2d 56 (111. App 1995). In Goran, the
c

uiart attorne}' withdraw .som representing i.ne clients in an appea;. out as a re.^,u ; i

1lic attorney's pie\ IOU^ iieyjo I lllln « IK nil iiinnrrd 1»l ,tHl m jfinitrys 1 lu;s lu hiiii11 In i
brief into compliance with court rules. The court held that the $1,297 in attorneys'' fees
triggered commencement of the statute of limitations. Id. at 477-478. Of course, that is
precisely" the situation i n the case at bar.
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Dr. Jensen argues that it would be illogical and unfair to rule that the statute of
limitations began runniag before he knew the full extent of his damages and that if he had
to file within four years of 1999 he could not have recovered the damages that he knew
about only when this Court applied the statute of limitations in 2005. To the contrary, it
is not at all unusual that a plaintiff does not know the full extent of injuries or damages
(present or future) until years after the wrongful act is committed. Nevertheless, the
statute of limitations begins running when some injury is suffered. That does not mean
that a plaintiff is left unprotected with respect to injuries, the full extent of which will not
be known until some future time. In the present case, for example, Dr. Jensen could have
protected himself by entering into a tolling agreement with Young by which the parties
agreed to toll the statute of limitations until this Court decided the Sawyers Case.
Alternatively, Dr. Jensen could have filed his malpractice case against Young and then
obtained an order from the court staying the action pending a final decision in the
Sawyers Case.7 Under either alternative, Young's interests would have been protected
because he would have been given notice that Dr. Jensen was asserting, or intended to
7

In Vansickle, supra, the court noted that its holding applying the statute of limitations
did not preclude lawyers from entering into tolling agreements where the amount of
damages may yet be uncertain or indicate that malpractice actions may not be stayed by a
court "in order to await the conclusion of some other proceeding that might establish a
client's damages." 599 S.E.2d at 861.
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assert, a malpractice case against him and Young could have taken appropriate action to
preserve records and witness memories.
On the other hand, it would be extreme^ unuu • *> peim,; a pianim; >Uvii a* .Dr.
Jensen In vuiil imlrfinilHv In filr i iii;ili)i;n:lii c Klium niinlil in IIIKII.TIVIN" I'iht i IIIMII'
i-or example, in the case at bar, the Sawyers Case was not decided "until almost a
J

~ " d e after the last act of malpractice was allegedly committed. In the interim, Young
K i; :uc, .i•..

.

.. -. ., _ .*.• _... or malpractice and, had :to reason to take steps to

protect himself by r-v <^ -:*:* -•? -n~H --, ; mem* tries.
Although Dr. Jensen argues that a ""balancing of hardships" analysis favors his
position, such an analysis is inapposite in this case. Dr. Jensen cannot meet this Court's
threshold showing for (In .ippliCiilion oi special ciiuiiimiancc . .- >CL lorthabo .\
because it is undisputed he cannot make "an initial shown-'

~-* *K -v

• • ' \

Jensen] did not know, and could not have reasonably discovered the facts underlying the
cause of action, in time to commence an action wiuiii« u-, • u.^, i::unatkni> penou]."

balance would be in favor of Young.
Dr. Jensen's failure to file his malpractice claims for a decade after the malpractice
vv as allegedly committed has substantial^ prejudiced Y ou> ^ > u jility to defend against
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the claims because of the passage of time, impaired memories of witnesses and lack of
records. All Dr. Jensen can point to as prejudice is that if the statute of limitations is
applied he will lose his claims. That is the normal result of the application of the statute
of limitations and is not a special circumstance. Dr. Jensen cites Klinger v. Knightly, 791
P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) to attempt to support his position on prejudice. However, in that
case the plaintiffs had no reason to suspect malpractice had been committed and could not
have reasonably done anything to discover the surveying error sooner. In any event, Dr.
Jensen has only himself to blame for not filing his alleged malpractice claims years ago
when the defamation claims (and fraud claim) were dismissed and he knew he had been
financially damaged and he repeatedly discussed with his attorney filing suit against
Young.
For all of these reasons, the district court correctly decided that Dr. Jensen's
purported malpractice claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
B.

DR. JENSEN'S ECONOMIC LOSS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIMS
ARE WITHOUT MERIT FOR TWO ADDITIONAL REASONS NOT
REACHED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
If the Court affirms on the statute of limitations issue, it need not reach the

alternative grounds for affirmance discussed in this section. However, even if it is
erroneously assumed for purposes of argument that Dr. Jensen's claims are not barred by
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the statute of limitations, this Court should, affirm the summary judgment because, as a
matter of law, Dr. Jensen's economic loss and punitive damage claims are w ithout merit
for t^ o additional reasons asseilotll Ihv \ ntuiii" mi sijitiiiui \ indjjiiicnl, hul moll icached bv
(In; (li'iilnn roiml

ilns Court can affinn on any basis upon which the district court could

have based its decision.8 See, Afridi, supra,
1

All of Dr. Jensen's Alleged Economic Loss Was Suffered as a Result of
the First Broadcast and Any Claim for Such Loss Was Barred Long
Before Dr. Jensen Retained Young to Represent Him.

This Court ruled in the Sawyers Case that all of Dr. Jensen's alleged economic loss
w as suffered as the result of the First Broadcast on September 5,, 1.995. [SOF No, ^4."j
Dr. Jensens claims tor SUCH i m a g e s were therefore barred under the one-year
d--... -«

'tinieij HI 1 lifih < "<Hlrj Aim i) 7K«P-1(»f4i (renumbered

.' *

to 78B-2-302(4j) bv September 5, 1996. Yet, Dr. Jensen did not sign a fee agreement
- .ining Young to represent him until many months later on April 9, 1997
. In this connection, Dr. Jensen semi "*i (mug a lellei delicti I'ebruan "ft, I" W ,
informing Voting, of ("he dnte- -• >!K- three broadcasts and statine. "Allen I realize you
have not yet accepted this va-.

^

:

- No, 26 ] Thus. Dr. Jensen knew as of February 6,,

8

If the Court were to reverse on the statute of limitations issue, it should nevertheless
decide these alternative grounds for dismissing the economic loss and punitive damage
claims because dismissal of these claims would greatly simplify the case, leaving only a
small general damages claim to be deci.ico
"0

1997, that Young had not agreed to represent him. Of course, in order to recover for legal
malpractice, Dr. Jensen is required to prove the existence of an attorney-client
relationship with Young at the relevant time.
In Utah, an implied attorney-client relationship may exist if a client reasonably
believes that he or she is represented by the attorney. Kilpatrick v. Wiley Rein & Fielding,
2001 UT 107, If 47, 37 P.3d 1130. "However, a party's belief that an attorney-client
relationship exists, unless reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the
attorney, is not sufficient to create a confidential attorney-client relationship." BreuerHarrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990). Accord, Guilledeau v.
Jenkins, 355 S.E.2d 453, 458 (Ga. App. 1987); Fox v. Pollack, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532, 535
(1986).
Here, Dr. Jenson could not have reasonably believed that Young represented him
prior to February 6, 1997, because Dr. Jensen unequivocally acknowledged in his letter
that Young had not accepted the case.9
9

Below, Dr. Jensen tried to down play the significance of the letter by arguing in
conclusory fashion that "the statement made in the letter was in reference to Young's
desire to wait to file claims against KTVX until the resolution of the DOPL
investigation." [R. 50.] That argument substantially distorts the letter and Dr. Jensen's
deposition testimony about the letter. Indeed, when questioned at his deposition
regarding his statement "Allen I realize you have not yet accepted this case," Dr. Jensen
did not distort or "put a spin" on its plain meaning, as he does now. To the contrary, Dr.
Jensen testified as follows:
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Moreover, the week before September 27, 1996, Dr. Jensen met with attorney
Charles Thronson to discuss Thronson taking h is case. Thronson declined to do so by
letter dated September 2 1 , 1996, pri.iii.aril) ' because of the problem,,, with the statute limitations that I h ronsonhad discussed v ith, lensen at the if meeting. [SOF N:

]

Equally importantly, on October 4, 1995, approximately one month after the First
Broadcast (and after Dr. Jensen claims Young agreed to take the case), Dr. Jensen
<iw.j.;ju:TO\t. ,.
U" •••• * ^ ~ ir.v. ' i v v;r

.. :. •
'

....
J

«

-

i Sti) s that he

% after st^idine hun a letter stating "I would say i

need legal advise [sic]." Dr. Jensen informed his attorney in the DOPL investigation that
Mr. Howard had agreed to take Dr. Jensen's case. This was prior to the expiration of
the statute of 11 in ita11n11s <' 11111v I ;i i sI Broadcast [S<

]

(),

/ mi i "you confirming or are you not confirming he" s [ t oung] not) ret
jit i I'pted the ca se?

A.

/ choose to read it as stated: "Allen* 1 realize you have not yet
accepted this case. But I do appreciate your interest so far." I
consider that to be a correct statement

O

All right So it's just what the plain meaning oj the statement is,
fair?

A.

It is.

[R. 722-721 (Emphasis added).]

Clearly, based upon Dr. Jensen's attempt to get Thronson and Howard to take his
case and Dr. Jensen's letter of February 6, 1997, acknowledging that Young had not
agreed to take the case, Dr. Jensen could not have reasonably believed at these times that
Young represented him.
Nevertheless, Dr. Jensen testified in his deposition only in conclusory terms that he
considered Young to be his lawyer after the alleged first meeting shortly after the First
Broadcast. Dr. Jensen strategically asserted this position even though he had not signed a
retainer agreement, even though he had no agreement with Young on how Young would
be paid, and even though at the alleged first meeting, Young allegedly told Jensen that he
wanted to take the case but he wanted to see what the DOPL investigation showed first so
that Young would know whether Dr. Jensen was a "good guy or a bad guy."
Moreover, Dr. Jensen's alleged belief, even if taken at face value for the purpose
of summary judgment, was not reasonable as a matter of law and therefore did not give
rise to an attorney-client relationship between Dr. Jensen and Young. As demonstrated
above, a client's belief that an attorney-client relationship exists is insufficient unless
"reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the attorney...." Breuer-Harrison,
799 P.2d at 727. Based upon the only words that Dr. Jensen puts into Young's mouth at
the first meeting, Young did not agree to take the case, but wanted to see the results of the
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DOPL investigation first. The DOPL investigation was not completed and the stipulation
with DOPL entered into until October 30, 1996, almost two months after the statute of
limitations exp^rcu on u.v d^aiuuuoii c;jim relating to the First Broadcast

communication with Young until fourteen months later on November 12, 1996, when Dr.
Jensen sent Young a tape of the Third Broadcast. [SOT Nos 1 ^ 22.] Young had still not
received a copy of the stij .
his Janu:

2"

. ^u^.

997 lette •

*.,

" ^ouestinc '

:^..
*

.., v * .

'^ ' ]?+tr

g wrote
".could

review Dr. Jensen's agreement with DO:*L »•_*' « ^ecutc -« hctncr to take 'he < ase.
Importantly,. Dr, Jensen understood that Young "wanted to see that the state's conclusions
ahouill ilie ivci't cnmpk'lnl
c o n c e r n w a s n o t sa tisfled

""IIMI

I lie stale u*is iiiiiii Inngei goiny alki nu " iiiul

until sometime after Youne's* : anuan 2 7 . 1997 letter r^< )F

No. 23.] Further, as referenced above, Jensen confirmed in a letter dated Februan ^.
1997 dial ike unav.i .Vu« *a Young had not yet agreed to take the case. [SOF N o. 26.]
I )i

leihi/m also mistakenly nrpued hciov llvil i n v n il nn iltorrir 1 if limit

xwx^wv/^sh^p existed prior to April, 1997, Young had duties to him as a prospective client
to advise him on the statute of limitations because "Dr. Jensen received advice from
Young b> senuiiiu :*;n; ieuer.>. waii;:.t mm, and giving him copies oi \ ideotapes to
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review." [R. 500-499.] However, under Utah law, Young had no duty to advise Dr.
Jensen unless and until Dr. Jensen had a reasonable belief that Young was representing
him and that reasonable belief must have been induced by Young's conduct. This is no
doubt why Dr. Jensen cited cases from other states inconsistent with Utah Law to attempt
to support his argument. This argument also finds no support in the record.
In this connection, in the cases cited by Dr. Jensen below there was significantly
more communication between the lawyer and the prospective client than in the case at
bar. For example, in Togstad v. Vesely Otto Miller andKeefe, 299 N.W.2d 686, 693
(Minn. 1980), the court found that an attorney-client relationship actually existed, that the
client went to the attorney who told her that there was not a case and why, did not inform
the client that the attorney lacked expertise in the medical malpractice area and did not
inform the client of the statute of limitations.
There is not a shred of evidence, other than Dr. Jensen's self-proclaimed belief,
that an attorney-client relationship existed with Young prior to April, 1997. Because Dr.
Jensen could not have reasonably believed that Young represented him prior to April
1997, Young had no duty to advise him on the statute of limitations prior to that time.
Dr. Jensen's claim for economic loss damages therefore fails.
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Consequently, because Dr. Jensen's claim for $520,000 in economic loss relating
u>the4 First Broadcast was already barred long before Dr. Jensen retainer mm. , "oung was
.* summaryju^i-c:.
reason.

"

2.

'

. v .

As a Matter of Law, Dr. Jensen Is Not Entitled to Recover Punitive
Damages Relating to the First and Second Broadcasts.

lh lilt' ^u>\\c,1:* va.se. Liu; jury a w a r d s . ..-. . \ : : ^ . ;?-.. .

$24-W>-

-

-

-..;;:. . . „ ^ T

, a rded Dr. Jensen

$450,600.00 in punitive damages relating to the Third Broadcast, Although this Court
stated that its impression was "that the third broadcast was likely the least defensible of '
the three, we conclude Lhal il? tniiltnil dms nnl i c\ cal «n lual mil ice and Ihnvlnrv i unilr
the P •

" • /• *••

'.- W :K:^

/ Jensen, 2005 UT 81, | 11 /. The Court explained that:

"[S]tatei:.j:i!- J : actual malice are those made 'with knowledge that [they] were false or
[made] with reckless disregard of "whether [they] wea. jui:*e or not,'" quoting from Bose
Coti

onsunurs I nam, l<Wi I I N -1" "i I'lN-'MP il |M -Il /*/ ill 1 I I
The Court held that the contents of the Third Broadcast "fall short of indicating

personal 'malice rising to the level of hatred or ill-will on (he p;4rt of defendants against
Dr. Jensen.' Jensen, -00:* i 11 JS 1 , ^| i " il I lie L our: .u ;.\.

: «. .jrc was

insufficient evidence from whirh (he ( nnrl roulrl nitielmlc (lu'i! defendants "did not hold
[5

an honest belief that Dr. Jensen had offered or promised her [Sawyers] Dexedrine, which
is illegal for use in weight loss." Id. at ]f 122. The Court went on to observe that "[i]t is
clear that Dr. Jensen manifested an intent or willingness to act in a specific manner - to
provide Dexedrine - although it was not legal for weight loss purposes." Id.
This Court's decision in the Sawyers Case likewise bars any claim for punitive
damages relating to the First and Second Broadcast. The district court did not reach this
issue because it held the claims relating to the First and Second Broadcasts were barred
by the statute of limitations. The part of the Third Broadcast showing Dr. Jensen telling
Sawyers that "[i]f Fastin didn't work for you, I'd be willing to work with you, ah, maybe,
using Dexedrine. It's technically not legal for that reason" was a replay from the First
Broadcast. Thus, this Court has already ruled that this report contained in the First
Broadcast which was repeated in the Third Broadcast does not support an award of
punitive damages.
The Second Broadcast only reported that DOPL had filed a petition for
unprofessional conduct against Jensen and again reviewed the report aired in the First
Broadcast that Dr. Jensen had offered to "work with" Sawyers on illegally prescribing her
Dexedrine. Id. at Tf 15. It was undisputably true that DOPL filed a petition for
unprofessional conduct against Dr. Jensen. Id. at ^f 14. And, once again, the repetition of
46

the same report aired in the First Broadcast that this Court has already held does not
support punitive damages cannot support punitive damages with respect to the Second
Broadcast.
I'm these reasons, [>r Jensen s .'limns le ixw-wi \\\v pin ili\e damages Ilk' \nv\
awarded with respect to the First and Second Broadcasts were properly dismissed.
CONCLUSION
I m -nil i.il tin1 f(ji'egi»iug reasons, lite Summary Judgment should be affirmed In
the alternative, if for some reason the Court should reverse on the statute of limitations
Issue, the Court: should nevertheless affirm the dismissal of the economic loss and
™.:. :... uainage claims on the alternative grounds.
- • "r'V-:- :••

(i::v . S, :)tenibci 2DW.
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ADDENDUM
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130 F.3d 325,33 Media L. Rep. 25 1 8, 539 Utah \d\
(Cite as: 130 P.3d 325)

Supreme Court of Utah.
Michael JENSEN, M.D., Plaintiff; Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant
Mary SAWY ERh an J ^ n ucu icic vjsion, Inc., aka
KTVX, Defendants. Appellants, and Cross-Ap-

No\. ;>. 20li
Rertearinc T Vr't"i s *>

:C 06

Background: Doctor brought action against reporter and television station for defamation, invasion of
privacy, and intentional interference with economic
relations following news broadcasts of doctor's alleged hidden camera admissions regarding prescription diet pills. The District Court, Fourth District,
Prove Department, Ray M. Harding, Jr ,, J., entered
judgment on jury verdict for doctor, but reduced
damages award and denied attorney's fees and
costs. Reporter and. television station appealed, and
doctor cross-appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Nehring, J., held
that
(1) false light: invasion of privacy el aims were properly classified as defamation claims and thus were
subject to one-year statute of limitations;
(2) doctor was not: required to show that news
broadcast portrayed private information about him
in order to recover on claim of false light invasion
of privacy;
(3) Court' would not review, based on a traditional
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, jux)
verdict in favor of doctor on intrusion upon seclusion species of invasion of privacy claim;
(4) failure to marshall evidence regarding the substantial truth of statements on news broadcast concerning doctor's willingness to prescribe diet pills

Rep. 6, 2005 I J I ' 81

jon^ace fc.am: *.», ^i^cal.
(5- broadcast did not result in ecomnnk loss such
thai vioctoi could recover damages for defamation:
/porter did not act with "actual malice" when
.ated in news broadcast that doctor "promised"
:• i!legal drug:>. at
(7) invasion of privacy claims based on newsgathering did not substantially overlap with defamation
and false light claims based on news broadcast such
that doctor was entitled to attorney's fees for unsuccessfti 1 newsgallien.ng c 1 ai:m.s
Affi.riii.ed. in. part and reversed in part,
West Headnotes
| 1 | Appeal and Lr «r *0 C=>1?9(1)
r>pea- and i:rn<
*0\ Presentai. -i tv. * ,
-ounds oi Review
\ '. Issues and Que>
>0kHQ Suftlcier.
Question

ir

muT

i
Cases
Trial court ruling \ ,-JJ aoetor,- false light invasion
of privacy claims against reporter and television
station were not time-barred, made in the context of
denying defendants -notion for summary judgment
seeking dismissal of the claims on statute of limitatnons grounds, adequately preserved for review the
issue of the question of the applicable statute of
limitations, although defendants did not reassert
their statute of limitations claim at trial.
. • »k>el A nd Sianuei 237 © ^ 7 6
23 7 Libel and Slant:JI
2371V Actions
237TV(A) Right of Action and Defenses
237k76 k. Time to Sue and. Limitations.
Most Cited Cases
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One-year limitations period applies to actions for
defamation. West's U.C.A. § 78-12-29(4).
[3] Libel and Slander 237 €=>1
237 Libel and Slander
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability
Therefor
237kl k. Nature and Elements of Defamation
in General. Most Cited Cases
Slander and libel are a subset of defamation.
[4] Libel and Slander 237 C=>24
237 Libel and Slander
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability
Therefor
237k23 Publication
237k24 k. Slander. Most Cited Cases
"Slander" consists of the publication of defamatory
matter by spoken words, transitory gestures or by
any form of communication other than libel. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568(2).
[5] Libel and Slander 237 C=>25
237 Libel and Slander
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability
Therefor
237k23 Publication
237k25 k. Libel. Most Cited Cases
"Liber1 consists of the publication of defamatory
matter by written or printed words in physical form
or by any other form of communication that has the
potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 568(1).
[6] Libel and Slander 237 €=>68
237 Libel and Slander
237IV Actions
237IV(A) Right of Action and Defenses
237k68 k. Nature and Form of Remedy.
Most Cited Cases

Libel and Slander 237 €=>76
237 Libel and Slander
237IV Actions
237IV(A) Right of Action and Defenses
237k76 k. Time to Sue and Limitations.
Most Cited Cases
Doctor's false light invasion of privacy claims
against reporter and television station arising out of
news broadcasts concerning prescription diet pills
were properly classified as defamation claims and
thus were subject to one-year statute of limitations,
such that complaints regarding first two of three
news broadcasts were time-barred; doctor had
stated in his complaint that false statements during
news broadcasts had harmed his reputation. West's
U.C.A. §78-12-29.
[7] Libel and Slander 237 €==>!
237 Libel and Slander
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability
Therefor
237kl k. Nature and Elements of Defamation
in General. Most Cited Cases
"Defamation" is the act of harming the reputation
of another by making a false statement to a third
person.
[8] Torts 379 €=>353
379 Torts
379IV Privacy and Publicity
379IV(B) Privacy
379IV(B)3 Publications or Communications in General
379k352 False Light
379k353 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
An actionable portrayal of a person in a false light
may or may not include the communication of defamatory information about the victim.
[9] Torts 379 €=>354
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ealaai Error 30 €=>757(3)

3^9 Torts~ ~ o f \ p r i vacy an cil Pub II, it c ity
3"Mv(B) Pri\ ac)
379IV(B)3 Publications or Communications in General
379k352 False Light
379k354 k. Particular Cases in General. Most Cited Cases
Doctor was not required to show that news broadcast portrayed private information about him in order to recover on, claim, of 'false light invasion, of
privacy against reporter and television station
which broadcast news feature that stated that doctor
had promised reported illegal drugs and had received public reprimand.

30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts
30k,757(3) k. Statement of Evident *• >.. t
Cited Cases
Supreme Court would, not review, based on a traditional challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
jury verdict in favor of doctor on intrusion upon seclusion species of invasion of privacy claim, against
reporter and television station, given that reporter
and station failed to object to jury verdict on intrusior upon seclusion and also failed to marshal! the
evidence. West's U.C..A. § 76-9-402.

[10] \ppeal and Error 30 €=>181

[12] Appeal and Error 30 G=>766

30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation, in. Lower
Court of Grounds of Review
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and, "R uiings
Thereon
30kl81 k. Necessity of Objections in
General. Most Cited Cases
The plain error test has three parts; the demonstration of error, a qualitative showing that the error
was plain,, manifest, or obvious to the trial court,
and, evidence that the error affected the substantial
rights of a party.,

30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k766 k. Defects, Objectioris, arid !» „mend
ments. Most Cited Cases
Reporter and television station foiled to preserve or
brief argument in footnote that it was impossible
for television station to be liable for invasion of privac> if reporter was not liable, and thus Supreme
Courr would not address claim. West's U.C.A. §

[Ill Appeal and. Error 30 C=?218.2(2)
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in. Lower
Court of Grounds of Review
30V(B) Objections and !v lotioils, and R uIIings
Thereon
30k218 Verdict and. Findings by Jury
30k218.2 Special Interrogatories and.

" 7 ( > . 0 - 4 ' P ( t »i-».

.gliuence
272XVIII Actions
272XVIII(D) Questions for Jury and Directed ^ e«vi.
. 2k 1693 k. Negligence as Question of
Met or Lav\ Generally. Most Cited Cases
The question of whether a defendant's conduct fell
neiow a particular standard of care is one to !x de

Finding-

30k218.2(2) k. Nature of Error or
Defect. Most Cited Cases

4

^

- M o - m e n f 231H €==»87

2 >! 1 i Labor and Employ men;
:
" '" Rights and Dutn.-- oi Lnoloyers and
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Employees in General
231Hk87 k. Privacy in General. Most Cited
Cases
Torts 379 €=>331

Supreme Court would not conduct de novo review
of jury verdict in favor of doctor on intrusion upon
seclusion claim against reporter and television station.
[17] Appeal and Error 30 €=>766

379 Torts
379IV Privacy and Publicity
379IV(B) Privacy
379IV(B)1 Privacy in General
379k331 k. Nature and Extent of Right
in General. Most Cited Cases
Subject to certain limitations, the workplace enjoys
lesser privacy protections than a dwelling.
[15] Torts 379 €=»340
379 Torts
379IV Privacy and Publicity
379IV(B) Privacy
379IV(B)2 Intrusion
379k340 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Torts 379 €=»376
379 Torts
379IV Privacy and Publicity
379IV(B) Privacy
379IV(B)5 Questions of Law or Fact
379k376 k. Intrusion. Most Cited
Cases
Whether a person is entitled to solitude of seclusion
is a relative and highly fact-dependent matter.
[16] Appeal and Error 30 €=>893(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(F) Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate
Court
30k893(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases

30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k766 k. Defects, Objections, and Amendments. Most Cited Cases
Reporter's and television station's failure to marshall evidence regarding the substantial truth of
their allegedly defamatory statements on news
broadcast concerning doctor's willingness to prescribe diet pills forfeited claim on appeal to Supreme Court's substantial evidence review of the
defense of substantial truth.
[18] Appeal and Error 30 €=>840{3)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k840 Review of Specific Questions
and Particular Decisions
30kS40(3) k. Review of Constitutional Questions. Most Cited Cases
Where the First Amendment is implicated, the actual malice finding acquires the status of a constitutional fact requiring an appellate court to conduct
an independent examination of the whole record to
test its worthiness. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[19] Appeal and Error 30 €=»842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
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30k842(l) k. In General. Most

Findings

Cited Cases

30XVI(I)2 Verdicts
30kl001 Sufficiency of Evidence in

Appeal and Error 30 €=>1010.1(16)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30kl010 Sufficiency of Evidence in
Support
30kl010.1 In General
30kl010.1(8) Particular Cases
and Questions
30kl010.1(16)k. Negligence
and Torts in General. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court would review issue of whether media defendants' allegedly defamatory statements
were substantially true as a traditional question of
fact and would will set aside the jury verdict, which
was based in part on the finding that defendants'
statements were not substantially true, only if there
existed no substantial evidence to support it.
[20] Appeal and Error 30 €=>766
30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k766 k. Defects, Objections, and Amendments. Most Cited Cases
Reporter and television station failed to brief novel
contentions on appeal that Supreme Court considering defamation action should evaluate the issue of
substantial truth for correctness because they raised
the issues in motions for summary judgment and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict 0nov), and
thus Supreme Court would decline to consider
them.
[21] Appeal and Error 30 €=>1001(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and

Support
30kl001(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
The Supreme Court will disturb a jury verdict challenged for lack of evidence only if it concludes that
the quantity and quality of the evidence fall short of
substantial.
[22] Appeal and Error 30 €=>930(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k930 Verdict
30k930(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Appeal and Error 30 €=>989
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)1 In General
30k988 Extent of Review
30k989 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Where evidence may be susceptible to multiple interpretations, some tending to support the verdict,
others pointing to an ill-advised result, the Supreme
Court will indulge only those reasonable inferences
favorable to the verdict.
[231 Libel and Slander 237 €=»32
237 Libel and Slander
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability
Therefor
237k31 Injury from Defamation
237k32 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Third news broadcast regarding doctor's alleged
promise to prescribe illegal diet pills and his pun-
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ishment by state did not result in economic loss
such that doctor could recover damages for defamation; doctor's loss of insurance panel privileges occurred prior to third broadcast, doctor voluntarily
left clinic for nursing home work after his hours
were decreased following the broadcast, and doctor's income increased after he left the clinic.
[24] Libel and Slander 237 € » 5 1 ( 1 )
237 Libel and Slander
23711 Privileged Communications, and Malice
Therein
237k51 Existence and Effect of Malice
237k51(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Statements of "actual malice" are those made with
knowledge that they were false or made with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
[25] Libel and Slander 237 €=>120(2)
237 Libel and Slander
237IV Actions
237IV(D) Damages
237kl20 Exemplary
23 7k 120(2) k. On Ground of Malice or
Recklessness. Most Cited Cases
Television reporter did not act with "actual malice"
necessary for punitive damages when she stated in
allegedly defamatory news broadcast that doctor
"promised" her illegal drugs, although newscast
was not fair and balanced; doctor had manifested an
intent or willingness to prescribe a drug to help reporter lose weight even though the drug was not
legal for weight loss purposes, reporter had confirmed that prescribing that drug for weight loss
was illegal, and reporter believed that doctor had
offered her illegal drugs on camera.
[26] Costs 102 €=»194.16
102 Costs
102VIII Attorney Fees
102k 194.16 k. American Rule; Necessity of

Contractual or Statutory Authorization or Grounds
in Equity. Most Cited Cases
Attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by
statute or by contract.
[27] Appeal and Error 30 €=>1024.1
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)6 Questions of Fact on Motions
or Other Interlocutory or Special Proceedings
30kl024.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The award of attorney fees is a matter of law reviewed for correctness.
[28] Appeal and Error 30 €=>984(5)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k984 Costs and Allowances
30k984(5) k. Attorney Fees. Most
Cited Cases
Costs 102 €=>19<M8
102 Costs
102VIII Attorney Fees
102kl94.18 k. Items and Amount; Hours;
Rate. Most Cited Cases
A trial court has broad discretion in determining
what constitutes a reasonable fee, and the Supreme
Court will consider that determination against an
abuse-of-discretion standard.
[29] Appeal and Error 30 C=>984(5)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k984 Costs and Allowances
30k984(5) k. Attorney Fees. Most
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Cited Cases
The standard of review on appeal of the amount of
a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error
or clear abuse of discretion.
[30] Costs 102 €=>194.25
102 Costs
102VIII Attorney Fees
102k 194.24 Particular Actions or Proceedings
102kl94.25 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Doctor's invasion of privacy claims based on newsgathering did not substantially overlap with defamation and false light claims based on news broadcast such that doctor was entitled to attorney's fees
for unsuccessful newsgathering claims; there was
not a core of facts common to all claims, and the
legal theories were unrelated.
[31] Costs 102 C=>194.18

102 Costs
102VIII Attorney Fees
102k 194.18 k. Items and Amount; Hours;
Rate. Most Cited Cases
In general, a prevailing party may collect attorney
fees on noncompensable claims only if those claims
substantially overlap with compensable claims.

[33] Costs 102 €=»198

102 Costs
102IX Taxation
102k 198 k. Form and Requisites of Application in General. Most Cited Cases
The party requesting the attorney fees must categorize the time and fees expended for: (1) successful
claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there
may be an entitlement to attorney fees had the
claims been successful, and (3) claims for which
there is no entitlement to attorney fees.
[34] Costs 102 €=>206
102 Costs

102IX Taxation
102k206 k. Objections to Taxation or to
Items. Most Cited Cases
Reporter sufficiently complied with Rules of Civil
Procedure when she filed objection, rather than a
motion, opposing doctor's claimed costs in defamation action. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d)(2).
[35] Costs 102 e=»154

102 Costs
102VII Amount, Rate, and Items
102k 154 k. Depositions and Affidavits. Most
Cited Cases

[32] Appeal and Error 30 C=>761
Costs 102 €=>169

30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k761 k. Points and Arguments. Most Cited
Cases
Attorney's statement on appeal that, if the court examined his submissions, it would see that the criteria for attorney's fees was met, was insufficient argument on appeal for Supreme Court to override
trial court's finding that attorney failed to adequately divide time and fees expended for successful claims and unsuccessful claims.

102 Costs
102VII Amount, Rate, and Items
102k 169 k. Disbursements in General. Most
Cited Cases
Costs 102 €=»187

102 Costs
102VII Amount, Rate, and Items
102k 183 Witnesses'Fees
102k 187 k. Experts. Most Cited Cases
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Costs 102 €=>189

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

102 Costs
102 VII Amount, Rate, and Items
102k 189 k. Stenographers' Fees. Most Cited
Cases
Doctor's transcript costs, expert witness fees, court
equipment expenses, and other out-of-pocket costs
were not necessary and taxable as costs; deposition
costs were not essential, and doctor could not
demonstrate that a less expensive means of obtaining the transcripts would not have been practical.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d)(2).
[361 Appeal and Error 30 €=>984(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k984 Costs and Allowances
30k984(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
A trial court's decision to award the prevailing
party its costs will be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d)(2).
*328 Dale F. Gardiner, Douglas J. Parry, Craig R.
Kleinman, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Robert M. Anderson, Jennifer Anderson Whitlock,
Bradley M. Strassberg, Salt Lake City, and Thomas
B. Kelley, Steven D. Zansberg, Denver, CO, for defendants.
NEHRING, Justice:
f 1 Defendants Mary Sawyers and United Television appeal a jury verdict that they defamed Dr. Michael Jensen, invaded his privacy, and intentionally
interfered with his economic relations. Dr. Jensen
cross-appeals the trial court's reduction of part of
the damages award. He also cross-appeals the denial of attorney fees and denial of necessary disbursements as costs. We reverse in part and affirm in
part.

U 2 Geoff Goff, an executive producer for Channel
4, KTVX, in Salt Lake City, Utah, met Dr. Michael
Jensen at a 1995 Fourth of July party given by a
mutual friend, Ms. Johnson. Ms. Johnson, a restaurant critic, remarked to her cousin, Mr. Goff, and Dr.
Jensen that she had to exercise all the time because
her job required her to eat out so frequently. In response to her jocular comment, Dr. Jensen offered
to prescribe her diet drugs-amphetamines-which he
explained to Ms. Johnson were an easy and effective way to lose weight. Ms. Johnson did not express
any interest in his offer. Dr. Jensen nevertheless
persisted and wrote a prescription, giving it to Ms.
Johnson. He did so without taking a medical history
or making any appointment with her for a physical
examination. Ms. Johnson told Dr. Jensen she was
not interested in the prescription, but Dr. Jensen advised her to hold on to it, in case she wanted to fill
it later. Mr. Goff testified that he found it "unusual"
that a doctor would be handing out a prescription
for amphetamines at a party with no knowledge of
Ms. Johnson's medical history or background.
% 3 Later that evening, after Dr. Jensen had left the
party, Mr. Goff and Ms. Johnson discussed the
"unusual" interaction with the *329 physician. Both
believed that Dr. Jensen may have acted unethically
in providing a prescription for amphetamines to a
patient he had not examined. Mr. Goff stated that
"[a]t that point I began to feel that we ... had maybe
a news story here." The following day, Mr. Goff
met with KTVX news director John Edwards and
recounted Dr. Jensen's statements made at the
party. Mr. Goff "wrote up the facts as [he] knew
them ... to give to Mary Sawyers [the station's medical issues reporter] so she could begin looking into
the story."
1 4 Ms. Sawyers called Dr. Jensen and explained
that her managing news editor at KTVX, Mr. Goff,
had referred her to Dr. Jensen as someone who
could help her lose weight. During the conversa-
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tion, Ms. Sawyers explained that she was a reporter,
but implied that she was calling Dr. Jensen as a
prospective patient and not as a reporter. Ms. Sawyers told Dr. Jensen that she had "been on this diet
lately and [had not] been able to lose much
weight," so she asked if he could prescribe diet pills
for her. He replied that "yeah, [he] probably could."
Dr. Jensen told her that he would need to see her in
person to prescribe diet pills. He also relayed that
"I'm the guy to talk about weight loss ... many
physicians are reluctant to prescribe prescription
diet pills. I really am not." Dr. Jensen told her that
he prescribed Fastin and Pondimin, but that
"[traditionally what has been used is Dexedrine.
Dexedrine is technically illegal to ... use as a diet
pill. Though I... sometimes find people have other
disorders that I... feel comfortable using Dexedrine
with."
f 5 Ms. Sawyers found Dr. Jensen's admission that
he found ways to prescribe Dexedrine as a diet drug
"out of the ordinary" and, based on her further research about state laws relating to prescribing
drugs, likely illegal. As a result, Ms. Sawyers decided to further pursue the story, concluding that it
was "an issue of vital public interest."
f 6 Ms. Sawyers, Mr. Goff, and Mr. Edwards decided that Ms. Sawyers would pose as a patient and
visit Dr. Jensen. She would record her visit with a
hidden camera. The three believed that this plan
provided the best way to obtain candid information
from Dr. Jensen about his weight loss treatment
practices.
t 7 Ms. Sawyers scheduled a face-to-face appointment with Dr. Jensen. Ms. Sawyers met with Dr.
Jensen in an examination room at the Columbia
FirstMed Clinic in Orem, Utah. Ms. Sawyers explained that she was there to obtain the "safest,
easiest way to lose weight." Dr. Jensen explained
that Fastin and Pondimin were, at that time, the
most commonly prescribed medications for weight
loss. He added that "[i]f Fastin didn't work for you,

I would be willing to work with you ... maybe using
Dexedrine," but repeated his earlier comment that
prescribing Dexedrine for weight loss was illegal.
Dr. Jensen advised Ms. Sawyers that if she felt her
Fastin was wearing off and needed something to
pick her up, she could "take a small amount of the
capsule and bite it" as a means of "breaking the
time release form" of the drug, although doing so is
considered a misuse of that drug.
K 8 During the appointment, Dr. Jensen did not obtain a complete medical history of Ms. Sawyers. He
did not conduct a physical examination. He did not
ask her if she was then taking any medication. Dr.
Jensen's nurse took Ms. Sawyers' vital signs and
asked if she was allergic to any medicines. Ms.
Sawyers was not overweight or obese, and she was
not weighed by Dr. Jensen or his staff.
f 9 Approximately one month later, Ms. Sawyers
met with David Robinson, the director of Utah's Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
("DOPL"). Ms. Sawyers showed Mr. Robinson the
video tape of her appointment with Dr. Jensen.
After viewing the tape, Mr. Robinson expressed his
concerns about Dr. Jensen's interactions with Ms.
Sawyers, stating that "I think when you look at the
intent of the physician, it's clear that he knows that
he is violating the law and is offering excuses for it.
And I think he is doing so with potential jeopardy
to his patients.... I'm very concerned about it."
f 10 After meeting with Mr. Robinson, Ms. Sawyers arranged a second meeting with Dr. Jensen.
She told him that she wanted to interview him and
that she intended to present*330 a very positive
view of diet pills and that she was generally going
to talk about the positive effects of diet pills. Dr.
Jensen consented to the interview, and the two met
at his office at Columbia FirstMed.
% 11 Ms. Sawyers began the second meeting by
confronting Dr. Jensen with the statements about
diet drugs he had made when the two had met pre-
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viously. In response to his earlier remarks to Ms.
Sawyers about Dexedrine, Dr. Jensen told Ms. Sawyers that he had contacted a few pharmacists and
DOPL to obtain the rules and regulations for drug
prescriptions. He told her that he was no longer
able to "work with" her to obtain Dexedrine for
weight loss.
The First Broadcast
f 12 On September 5, 1995, Channel 4, KTVX, and
Ms. Sawyers aired the first report about Dr.
Jensen.
The report featured what it labeled
"miracle diet pills" and asked "are doctors prescribing these pills too freely?" Ms. Sawyers told viewers that Dr. Jensen prescribed weight loss medications to her without examining her or asking if she
had high blood pressure or diabetes, conditions
which could be aggravated by the drugs Fastin and
Pondimin. The broadcast also showed the hidden
camera footage of Dr. Jensen admitting to Ms. Sawyers that he would be "willing to work" with her
using Dexedrine, even though it was "technically
not legal for that reason." The report concluded by
showing a portion of Ms. Sawyers' interview with
Mr. Robinson at DOPL. Mr. Robinson was shown
telling Ms. Sawyers that the division was "very interested in" looking into Dr. Jensen's license. Ms.
Sawyers told viewers that the "State Division of Licensing and the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency
[have] both opened investigations into Dr. Jensen's
prescribing practices."
FN1. For convenience, this report will be
referred to as the September 5 report or the
first broadcast.
K 13 The next day, Columbia FirstMed terminated
Dr. Jensen's employment and Mountain View Hospital in Utah County revoked Dr. Jensen's privileges to practice medicine there. In addition, IHC
Health Plans removed Dr. Jensen from its insurance
panel due to his "unprofessional" and "possibly il-

legal" conduct that it believed had been disclosed in
the September 5 KTVX broadcast.
The Second Broadcast
f 14 Nine months later, DOPL filed a petition
against Dr. Jensen. The petition alleged that Dr.
Jensen's treatment of Ms. Sawyers violated Utah
Administrative Code rule 156-37-1 l(14)(a) and
FN2
(b),
and that Dr. Jensen had engaged in unprofessional conduct in violation of Utah Code section
FN3
58-l-501(2)(a), (b), and (g).
KTVX and Ms.
Sawyers aired their second report about Dr. Jensen
that same day, July 17, 1996.
FN2. These rules address unprofessional
conduct in prescribing, dispensing, and administering controlled schedule III or IV
drugs for the purpose of weight reduction.
FN3. Section 58-1-501 defines unlawful
and unprofessional conduct. Sections 2(a)
and 2(b) prohibit aiding or abetting any
other person to violate any law or professional/ethical standard, such as explaining
to Ms. Sawyers how to abuse Fastin. Section 2(g) relates to practicing a profession
through gross incompetence, gross negligence, or a pattern of incompetency or
negligence.
Utah
Code
Ann. §
58-l-501(2)(a)-(b),(g)(1994).
f 15 The second news broadcast told viewers that
DOPL had filed a petition for unprofessional conduct against Dr. Jensen. The second broadcast also
reviewed the assertion made in the first, specifically, that Dr. Jensen had offered to "work with" Ms.
Sawyers on illegally prescribing her Dexedrine.
K 16 Later that year, Dr. Jensen settled the DOPL
complaint. He admitted that he had "failed to comply with some of the requirements" of Utah's Controlled Substance Rules. Dr. Jensen agreed to a
public reprimand, to meet quarterly with profes-
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sional licensing board members for one year, and to
complete courses on proper prescribing practices
and medical ethics.
The Third Broadcast
Tf 17 KTVX aired a third broadcast on November 6,
1996. This broadcast highlighted problems with
"questionable doctors" in Utah and gave viewers
instructions to find *331 out which Utah doctors
had been disciplined or who had received complaints for unprofessional conduct. The broadcast
named three physicians who had been censured, including one physician who stood accused of sexually abusing a patient and another of performing illegal abortions. Then Ms. Sawyers asked viewers,
"And what about Dr. Michael Jensen? In July 1995,
we caught him on camera promising me illegal
drugs for weight loss." She said that
action has now been taken against Dr. Michael
Jensen. He's the one we caught on tape promising
me illegal drugs. The state will allow Jensen to
keep his license but he'll receive a public reprimand which requires him to attend a workshop on
proper prescribing and a course on medical ethics.
Procedural History of the Lawsuit
<f 18 After the third broadcast, Dr. Jensen filed suit
against Ms. Sawyers and KTVX ("defendants"). He
sought relief under five causes of action:fraudand
misrepresentation, intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, negligent misrepresentation, defamation of character, and negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment to
dismiss Dr. Jensen's claims of fraud and negligent
misrepresentation. They also sought summary judgment on Dr. Jensen's defamation claims relating to
the first and second broadcasts, alleging they were
barred by the one-year statute of limitations. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4).

f 19 Dr. Jensen responded to the statute of limitations defenses by seeking to amend his complaint to
add four additional claims that would be immune to
limitation challenges: (1) invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion; (2) violation of state; (3)
federal wiretapping laws; and (4) false light invasion of privacy.
K 20 The trial court granted defendants' summary
judgment motion on the claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation and on the claim of defamation as to the first and second broadcasts, but also
permitted Dr. Jensen to amend his complaint.
f 21 Defendants then brought a second round of
motions seeking dismissal of the amended claims.
Of the many contentions advanced in these motions
only one is relevant to this appeal: that the one-year
statute of limitations for defamation should apply to
Dr. Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claim.
The trial court denied that motion, and the case
went to trial.
K 22 The jury returned a verdict for Dr. Jensen for
false light invasion of privacy on the first and
second broadcasts and awarded him $520,000 in
economic damages, $85,000 in general damages,
and $245,300 in punitive damages. Ruling separately on the third broadcast, the jury also returned a
verdict for Dr. Jensen for false light invasion of privacy and defamation and awarded Dr. Jensen $1
million for economic loss, $500,000 in general
damages, and $450,600 in punitive damages. The
jury also found for Dr. Jensen on his common law
intrusion on seclusion and violation of privacy
claims and awarded him $90,000. Last, the jury
found for Dr. Jensen on his tortious interference
claim and awarded him $25,000 in general damages
and $25,000 in punitive damages.
| 23 The trial court granted defendants' motion to
alter the judgment, finding that the jury's award of
damages for common law intrusion on seclusion
duplicated the award for statutory violations, and
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reduced the three awards by $180,000 to a single
award of $90,000.
f 24 Ms. Sawyers and KTVX appealed. They attribute multiple errors to the trial court. First, they assert that the one-year statute of limitations that
barred Dr. Jensen's defamation claims based on the
first and second broadcasts should also bar his false
light invasion of privacy claims.
f 25 Next, they challenge the jury's false light invasion of privacy verdict stemming from the third
broadcast on the grounds that all of the information
disclosed in the third broadcast concerned Dr.
Jensen's professional affairs and was, therefore, not
actionable as an invasion of privacy.
f 26 For similar reasons, defendants take issue with
the verdict awarding Dr. Jensen damages for intrusion on seclusion and violations of Utah privacy
protection statutes, insisting that Ms. Sawyers' surreptitious taping *332 of Dr. Jensen did not take
place under circumstances that amounted to an invasion of Dr. Jensen's privacy.
f 27 Fourth, defendants challenge the defamation
verdict for Dr. Jensen on the third broadcast because its contents were substantially true.
f 28 Fifth, defendants challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the jury's award of economic damages tied to the third broadcast.
K 29 Last, defendants claim that insufficient evidence exists to sustain the jury's punitive damages
award.
f 30 For his part, Dr. Jensen cross-appeals four issues. We will address three of his claims: that the
court was too restrictive in awarding him attorney
fees, that he should be awarded all of his claimed
costs because of rule 54(d)(2), and that his costs
were "necessary disbursements." His fourth crossappeal on reduction of damages is absorbed in our
section focusing on the common law seclusion

claim.
ANALYSIS
I. FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY AND
DEFAMATION SHARE THE SAME STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
[1] Tf 31 We first take up defendants' claim that Dr.
Jensen's recovery for false light invasion of privacy
based on the first two broadcasts must be vacated
because the one-year statute of limitations for deFN4
famation
governs claims for false light invasion of privacy, and Dr. Jensen filed his complaint
more than one year after the broadcasts aired. The
trial court ruled as a matter of law that the tort of
defamation was sufficiently different from false
light invasion of privacy to place it beyond the
reach of defamation's statute of limitations. The trial court reasoned that since no statute of limitations
expressly applies to invasion of privacy torts, Dr.
Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claim fell
within the ambit of Utah's four-year "catch-all"
statute of limitations "for relief not otherwise
provided for by law." Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25(3) (2000). FN5
FN4. Utah Code section 78-12-29(4) states
that "[a]n action may be brought within
one year ... for libel, slander, [or] assault."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (2000).
FN5. The trial court made its affirmative
ruling that Dr. Jensen's false light invasion
of privacy claims were not time-barred in
the context of denying defendants' motion
for summary judgment seeking dismissal
of the claims on statute of limitations
grounds. Dr. Jensen contends that this issue was not preserved for appeal because,
presumably, defendants did not reassert
their statute of limitations claim at trial. To
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do so would have been futile. The fashion
in which the trial court chose to deny defendants' summary judgment motion left
nothing regarding the statute of limitations
to be decided at trial. The trial court ruling,
which established the law of the case on
the question of the applicable statute of
limitations, was therefore preserved.
f 32 We now assess anew the legal question of
whether false light invasion of privacy enjoys a degree of kinship with defamation so close as to warrant a sharing of limitations periods. This undertaking of legal taxonomy requires that we examine the
features of both torts to identify what characteristics, if any, they have in common. We must assess
the relationship between the two claims in the context of the text and purpose of section 78-12-25(3).
[2][3][4][5] f 33 We begin with an examination of
the relevant statutory provisions. The legislature
has assigned a one-year limitations period to actions for libel and slander.
Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-29(4). The United States District Court for
Utah has predicted that we could rule that this oneyear limitations period applies to defamation actions. Watkins v. Gen. Refractories Co., 805
F.Supp. 911,917 (D.Utah 1992). Today we confirm
the accuracy of this prediction. The second relevant
statute is Utah's "catch-all" provision which establishes a four-year limitations period "for relief not
otherwise provided*333 for by law." Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-25(3).
FN6. Slander and libel are a subset of defamation. "Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken
words, transitory gestures or by any form
of communication other than [libel]." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568(2)
(1977). "Libel consists of the publication
of defamatory matter by written or printed
words ... in physical form or by any other
form of communication that has the poten-

tially harmful qualities characteristic of
written or printed words." Id. § 568(1).
[6] K 34 In assessing which of these two statutory
provisions applies to Dr. Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claims, we pay little heed to the labels placed on a particular claim, favoring instead
an evaluation based on the essence and substance of
the claim. See Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 14 (Utah 1990)
(noting that whether a claim exists should be based
on the "nature of the action and not the pleading labels chosen"). Applying this approach to Dr.
Jensen's claims, we hold that they are properly classified as defamation claims and thus fall within the
one-year limitation imposed by section 78-12-29.
[7] f 35 Defamation is the act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a
third person. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872
P.2d 999, 1007 (Utah 1994) ("To state a claim for
defamation, [one] must show that defendants published the statements concerning him, that the statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to
any privilege, that the statements were published
with the requisite degree of fault, and that their
publication resulted in damage."). This is what Dr.
Jensen said defendants did to him in his initial complaint. When the trial court dismissed his defamation claims on the first and second broadcasts because they were filed too late, Dr. Jensen amended
his complaint to frame defendants' alleged misdeeds as false light invasion of privacy. The conduct Dr. Jensen complained of under this theory
was the same, only the legal grounds for his grievances were different. We now turn to an examination of Dr. Jensen's alternative legal grounds for relief: false light invasion of privacy.
f 36 American jurisprudence has long recognized
the tort of invasion of privacy. Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905); see also Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years
of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L.Rev. 1335, 1353 (1992)
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(listing the first invasion of privacy cases: ''Marks
v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y. Sup.Ct. 908 (1893) (publishing of
picture of an actor, without consent, in newspaper
popularity contest enjoined); Mackenzie v. Soden
Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup.Ct. 1891)
(use of physician's name in advertising medicine,
without consent); Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F.
280 (C.C.D.Mass.1894) (publishing biography and
portrait of George H. Corliss, deceased inventor,
not an invasion of privacy because he was a public
figure; [the] opinion may be read to suggest,
however, that right to privacy exists)"). The genesis
of the tort of invasion of privacy in the United
States is generally traced to an 1890 law review article authored by law partners Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis in The Right to Privacy, 4
Harv.L.Rev. 193(1890).
f 37 The jury returned a verdict finding both KTVX
and Ms. Sawyers liable under multiple claims.
Based on its findings of liability, the jury awarded
Dr. Jensen general damages, damages for economic
loss, and punitive damages. The trial court entered
a seven-page, thirty-paragraph judgment detailing
the various damages awards and their allocations.
We will undertake to summarize the damages
awards in a condensed form that includes only the
damages awards subject to the challenges raised in
this appeal. We will not describe the allocations of
the various awards between Ms. Sawyers and
KTVX as only the aggregate damages awards are
affected by our rulings.
f 38 The jury was asked to consider separately Dr.
Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claims
arising from the combined first and second broadcasts and those linked to the third broadcast. This
organizational scheme permitted the jury to consider separately Dr. Jensen's defamation claim tied
to the third broadcast, a claim that unlike his defamation claims associated with the first and second
broadcasts, had not been extinguished by the statute
of limitations.

f 39 The jury awarded Dr. Jensen economic loss
damages totaling $600,000, general damages of
$100,000, and punitive damages of $245,300 based
on defendants' liability for false light invasion of
privacy on the first and second broadcasts.
\ 40 Defendants' liability for defamation and false
light invasion of privacy arising from the third
broadcast resulted in an *334 award of economic
loss damages of $1 million, general damages of
$500,000, and punitive damages of $450,600.
% 41 The jury awarded Dr. Jensen $50,000 in general damages and $40,000 in punitive damages
arising from defendants' liability under common
law intrusion upon seclusion. The jury awarded a
like $90,000 aggregate sum to Dr. Jensen on each
of two of the three state statutory claims.
f 42 The trial court supplemented its judgment with
an award of costs to Dr. Jensen totaling $7,412.46,
and attorney fees in the amount of $75,058.50.
% 43 In 1960, Dean Prosser surveyed the invasion
of privacy landscape and could not identify an internally consistent or coherent formulation of privacy based torts. He summarized the state of the
privacy tort law this way:
What has emerged from the decisions is no simple
matter. It is not one tort, but a complex of four.
The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds
of invasion of four different interests of the
plaintiff, which are tied together by the common
name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference
with the right of the plaintiff, in the phrase coined
by Judge Cooley, "to be let alone." Without any
attempt to exact definition, these four torts may
be described as follows:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or
solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
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about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage,
of the plaintiffs name or likeness.
It should be obvious at once that these four types
of invasion may be subject, in some respects at
least, to different rules; and that when what is
said as to any one of them is carried over to another, it may not be at all applicable, and confusion may follow.
Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad Co., 709 S.W.2d 475,
477 (Mo. 1986) (quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.
L.Rev. 382, 389 (I960)).
f 44 The second restatement of torts modified its
approach to invasion of privacy to accommodate
Dean Prosser's critique and proposed reforms. We,
in turn, have fashioned our invasion of privacy jurisprudence around the second restatement. Russell
v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896,
906-07 (Utah 1992).
K 45 False light invasion of privacy entered English
common law by an aggrieved Lord Byron. Protective of his reputation as a poet-his reputation for his
nonpoetic behavior was controversial and, to many,
beyond redemption-Byron successfully appealed to
the British courts to stay publication of a "spurious
and inferior poem attributed to him." Prosser, supra
f 43, at 398 (citing Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer.
29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816)). Although Byron's
grievance sprang from his concern for his literary
reputation, false light invasion of privacy does not
necessarily provide redress for injury to a person's
reputation. Instead, like each of the varieties of invasion of privacy, it owes its existence to the value
society places on the right to be left alone. As we
noted in Russell, it is because false light invasion of
privacy protects a different interest than defamation
that we have granted it status as an independent

tort. 842 P.2d at 907. As we will discuss shortly,
the difference in the interests protected by the two
torts is an insufficient reason, particularly under the
facts of this case, to justify the application of a separate statute of limitations to defamation and false
light invasion of privacy.
[8] 1 46 An actionable portrayal of a person in a
false light may or may not include the communication of defamatory information about the victim. As
the examples in the Restatement illustrate, a person
may conceivably be placed in a false light through
the dissemination of praiseworthy but untrue information about that person, if a reasonable person
would find the information highly objectionable.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, illus. 9
(1977); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and
Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion of
Privacy, *335 41 Case W. Res. 885, 896 (1991)
(reasoning that where nondisparaging false statements are disseminated about a person, "unless
nondisparaging false statements actually rise to the
level of highly offensive, the harm they bring about
may not be substantial enough to justify all the
costs involved in the recognition and administration
of a false light tort" and advancing this contention,
among others, to support his conclusion that false
light as a distinct tort claim should be "significantly
narrowed").
% 47 Whether false light invasion of privacy should
maintain its place within the invasion of privacy
canon is a question that has stimulated spirited debate among courts and commentators. As of 2002,
"thirty state courts acknowledge false light as a viable claim in their jurisdictions."
Denver
PuhVg Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 897 (2002)
(citing in part Bueno v. Denver Publ'g Co., 32 P.3d
491, 495 (Colo.Ct.App.2000)). Several states have
either rejected the cause of action entirely or have
not reached the issue because the facts of the case
did not merit a review of false light invasion of privacy. Id. Twelve states have declined invitations to
expressly welcome false light to join their invasion
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of privacy jurisprudence. Id.; see also Cain v.
Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 586 (Tex.1994).
The Colorado Supreme Court aptly characterized
false light invasion of privacy as " 'the leastrecognized and most controversial aspect of invasion of privacy.' " Denver Publ'g Co., 54 P.3d at
897 (quoting Cain, 878 S.W.2d at 579). In doing
so, the Colorado court also referenced various authorities' contentions that false light invasion of privacy's position as a distinct tort claim is tenuous at
best. Id. at 898.
FN7. Doe v. Roe, 638 So.2d 826
(Ala. 1994); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 783 P.2d 781
(1989); Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265
Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert,
denied sub nom. Little Rock Newspapers,
Inc. v. Dodrill, AAA U.S. 1076, 100 S.Ct.
1024, 62 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980); Fellows v.
Natl Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal.3d 234, 228
Cal.Rptr. 215, 721 P.2d 97 (1986);
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am.,
Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317
(1982); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189
A.2d 773 (Del.1963); Agency for Health
Care Admin, v. Assoc. Indus. ofFla., Inc.,
678 So.2d 1239 (Fla.1996); Cabaniss v.
Hipsley, 114 Ga.App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496
(1966); Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311,
971 P.2d 1135 (1998); Lovgren v. Citizens
First Nat'l Bank, 126 I11.2d 411, 128
Ill.Dec. 542, 534 N.E.2d 987 (1989); Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816 (Iowa
1977); Dotson v. McLaughlin, 216 Kan.
201, 531 P.2d 1 (1975); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623
S.W.2d 882 (Ky.1981), cert, denied, 456
U.S. 975, 102 S.Ct. 2239, 72 L.Ed.2d 849
(1982); Perere v. Louisiana Tel. Broad.
Corp., 721 So.2d 1075 (La.Ct.App.1998);
Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221,
1223 (Me. 1977); Harnish v. Herald-Mail

Co., 264 Md. 326, 286 A.2d 146 (1972);
Deitz v. Wometco W. Mich. TV, 160
Mich.App. 367, 407 N.W.2d 649 (1987);
Bd. of Dentistry v. Kandarian, 268 Mont.
408, 886 P.2d 954 (1994); Turner v. Welliver, 226 Neb. 275, 411 N.W.2d 298 (1987)
(citing false light invasion of privacy as
codified in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 20-204
(1983)); Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J.
282, 537 A.2d 284 (1988); Moore v. Sun
Publ'g Corp., 118 N.M. 375, 881 P.2d 735
(1994), cert, denied, 118 N.M. 430, 882
P.2d 21 (1994); McCormack v. Okla.
Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980);
Dean v. Guard Publ'g Co., 73 Or.App.
656, 699 P.2d 1158 (1985); Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 375 Pa.Super.
66, 543 A.2d 1181 (Pa.Super.Ct.1988);
Montgomery Ward v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d
806 (S.D.I979); West v. Media Gen. Convergence,
Inc.,
53
S.W.3d
640
(Tenn.2001); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992); Lemnah v. Am. Breeders Serv., Inc., 144 Vt.
568, 482 A.2d 700 (1984); Eastwood v.
Cascade Broad. Co., 106 Wash.2d 466,
722 P.2d 1295 (1986); Crump v. Beckley
Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699, 320
S.E.2d70(1983).
f 48 Critics of false light invasion of privacy point
to its substantial areas of overlap with defamation
as a sound reason not to legitimize it. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, supra f 46, at 887 (reasoning that a
"false [light] statement disparages the plaintiffs
conduct or character. If it is disparaging, however,
the plaintiff evidently has a defamation action
against the defendant").
t 49 Both defamation and false light invasion of
privacy provide legal redress for uninvited notoriety grounded in falsehoods caused by the defendant. Despite certain dissimilarities between defamation and false light invasion of privacy, such as the
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requirement that false information be publicized
more widely to be actionable under false light invasion of privacy than is necessary to sustain an action in defamation,
and the possibility*336 that
highly offensive but nondefamatory statements
could provide adequate grounds for a claim of false
light invasion of privacy, false light invasion of privacy and defamation have much in common. The
differences between the two claims are at their margins. It is important to note, however, that Dr.
Jensen's claims do not occupy these margins. The
operative facts of his false light invasion of privacy
claims allege defamation. In fact, they are the same
facts he pleaded under his defamation causes of action that were dismissed as untimely.
FN8. Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Corp.,
351 Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d 736 (1966)
(holding that publication to one person is
sufficient to maintain action for defamation). But see Russell, 842 P.2d at 907
(requiring that a false light invasion of privacy claim center on " 4[o]ne who gives
publicity to a matter concerning another
that places the other before the public [i.e.,
more than one person] in a false light is
subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy' " (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652E)).
^ 50 Defamation claims always reside in the shadow of the First Amendment. Because of its maturity
within the common law, defamation jurisprudence
has, over time, largely found a way to co-exist with
the demands placed on it by the freedom of speech.
In reaching an accommodation consistent with freedom of speech, defamation has accumulated a considerable assortment of defenses, privileges,
heightened burdens of proof, and particularized
standards of review.
% 51 The concern that claims like false light invasion of privacy with close ties to defamation might
be prosecuted free of the First Amendment safe-

guards present in defamation actions has drawn the
attention of both the drafters of the Restatements
and this court. This issue is taken up in a comment
to section 652E of the Restatement, which notes:
When the false publicity is also defamatory so that
either action can be maintained by the plaintiff, it
is arguable that limitations of long standing that
have been found desirable for the action for defamation should not be successfully evaded by
proceeding upon a different theory of later origin,
in the development of which the attention of the
courts has not been directed to the limitations.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, cmt. e
(1977).
K 52 We responded to a similar concern when we
held that Utah's statutory "fair report" privilege,
nominally applicable to allegations of defamation,
extended to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress tied to the same operative facts that
gave rise to defamation claims brought by a nurse
against a reporter and newspaper. Russell, 842 P.2d
at 902-03. We underscored our holding with citations to cases that applied shorter statutes of limitation for defamation and libel to causes of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and false
light invasion of privacy that were tied to defamatory statements. Id at 906 n. 37.
f 53 We are persuaded that the statute of limitations
cases used in Russell to buttress the merits of applying the fair report privilege to a cause of action
closely allied to defamation are equally persuasive
for the actual propositions they advance: that the
statute of limitations for defamation governs claims
based on the same operative facts that would support a defamation action. In recognition of the possibility that a false light invasion of privacy claim
may turn on operative facts that do not include defamation, we further limit our holding to the facts
present here and extend the one-year limit to false
light invasion claims that flow from allegedly de-
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famatory statements.

the claims.

K 54 Several additional considerations contribute to
our conviction of the soundness of this holding. Because, as this case clearly attests, virtually any defamation claim may be recast as an action for false
light invasion of privacy, were we to assign
"catch-all" status to false light invasion of privacy
we would effectively neuter the one-year defamation limitation. An express one-year statutory limitations period for defamation stands as the implied
product of the legislature's consideration of the
various policy considerations that inform the span
of time appropriate to bring an action.

K 57 We have not been asked to re-evaluate the
status of false light invasion of privacy in the tort
law of our state. Moreover, our discussion of the relationship between defamation and false light invasion of privacy should not be interpreted as an invitation to reconsider the viability of false light invasion of privacy. We remain sufficiently persuaded that there is certain unacceptable conduct
that could be within the reach of false light invasion
of privacy, but not defamation. Rather, our discussion bears on the narrow issue of whether the defamation statute of limitations should apply to
claims of false light invasion of privacy.

f 55 A shorter limitations period for defamation can
be explained and justified as an acknowledgment of
importance of the free speech interests with which
defamation collides. A shorter defamation period
reflects the importance placed on freedom of
speech by restricting the time those making statements *337 are exposed to legal challenges, thereby
reducing the chilling effect on speech that may accompany the prospect of defending statements well
beyond their shelf lives. By encouraging persons
aggrieved by allegedly defamatory statements to
bring claims promptly, a shorter limitations period
also increases the opportunities for defendants to
take prompt and meaningful remedial steps to mitigate a plaintiffs damages by, for example, publishing retractions.
f 56 The characterization of section 78-12-25(3) as
a "catch-all" carries with it the implication that
none of the claims captured by it will have enjoyed
the benefit of an individualized assessment of an
appropriate statute of limitations. Therefore in light
of strong affinity between defamation and Dr.
Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claims based
on defendants' defamatory statements, the assignment of those claims to the more fully reasoned
statutory category is superior to casting the claim
into the "catch-all" classification and disregarding
all consequences of the substantial commonality of

f 58 We are cautious about describing in any detail
the scope or contours of actions for false light invasion of privacy that do not involve allegations of
defamatory statements. These are not relevant here.
Dr. Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claims
are tied to the same operative facts that grounded
his defamation claims. Accordingly, we vacate the
verdicts relating to false light invasion of privacy
on the first and second broadcasts.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
PLAIN ERROR BY SUBMITTING THE FALSE
LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM ON
THE THIRD BROADCAST TO THE JURY
[9] T 59 Dr. Jensen's claim of false light invasion of
privacy linked to the third broadcast, which aired
November 6, 1996, was not vulnerable to a statute
of limitations challenge. Defendants nevertheless
challenge this portion of the jury verdict, asserting
that the verdict was the product of the trial court's
plain error.
f 60 According to defendants, the jury was improperly permitted to consider as actionable false light
portrayals of activities that related exclusively to
Dr. Jensen's professional life. Defendants assert
that because only matters of a personal nature can
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form the basis for false light invasion of privacy,
the depiction of Dr. Jensen's meeting with Ms.
Sawyers could not have formed the basis for recovery under a false light theory. Defendants did not,
however, offer a jury instruction on this point.
[10] f 61 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51(d) bars
appellate consideration of unpreserved defects in
jury instructions "except to avoid manifest injustice." Utah R. Civ. P. 51(d). We have interpreted
manifest injustice to be synonymous with plain error and that the same analytical model applies to
each. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,
799 (Utah 1991). The plain error test has three
parts: the demonstration of error; a qualitative
showing that the error was plain, manifest, or obvious to the trial court; and evidence that the error affected the substantial rights of a party. State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,fflf42-50, 82 P.3d 1106.
% 62 We are not persuaded that the trial court erred
when it did not include within the text of its instructions on the elements of false light invasion of
privacy a statement that the disclosures made about
Dr. Jensen in the broadcasts must have concerned
his private affairs, as distinguished from his personal life. The instruction given by the trial court included a verbatim recitation of the elements of false
light invasion of privacy as set out in section 652E
of the Restatement. *338 Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652E (1977). Moreover, comment a to this
section states:
The form of invasion of privacy covered by the rule
stated in this Section does not depend upon making public any facts concerning the private life of
the individual. On the contrary, it is essential to
the rule stated in this Section that the matter published concerning the plaintiff is not true.
Id. at cmt. a.
K 63 Inasmuch as we have endorsed the Restatement approach to invasion of privacy torts, Russell

v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 907
(Utah 1992); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563
(Utah 1988), the trial court would have acted contrary to this comment and likely committed error if
it had instructed the jury that to recover for false
light invasion of privacy, Dr. Jensen must show that
the broadcast portrayed private information about
him. Accordingly, we reject this challenge to the
third broadcast.
III. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED
GROUNDS TO DISTURB THE JURY'S VERDICT ON DR. JENSEN'S INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION CLAIM
[11][12] 1 64 Defendants next claim that the jury's
verdict awarding Dr. Jensen damages for the intrusion upon seclusion species of invasion of privacy
must be vacated. This common law claim is closely
allied with Utah's statutory privacy protections that
safeguard citizens against eavesdropping and communication abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402
(2003). The jury found that defendants had violated
section 76-9-402(1 )(a) to (c) and awarded Dr.
Jensen damages.
Defendants claim that the
jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Jensen for the statutory
claims must, like the verdict on the intrusion and
seclusion claim, be reversed. We disagree.
FN9. Defendants argue in a footnote that it
is impossible for United Television to be
liable under section 76-9-402(1 Xa) if Ms.
Sawyers is not also liable. However, defendants fail to preserve or brief this issue,
and therefore, we will not address it.
FN 10. However, we agree that the trial
court properly reduced the compensatory
and punitive damages on the gathering of
information claims. We therefore reject Dr.
Jensen's cross-appeal seeking reinstatement of the damages.
f 65 We begin our analysis of this portion of de-
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fendants' appeal by addressing a recurring theme:
standard of review. The manner in which the parties
have articulated the standard of review concerning
this component of their appeal provides a useful
framework to examine the standard of review issues
implicated here, even though defendants reach the
wrong conclusions about which standard should apply-an error of considerable consequence.

"neither error nor dangerous to justice to submit
legal issues to juries"); Tights, Inc. v. Acme-McCrary Corp., 541 F.2d 1047, 1060 (4th Cir.1976)
(holding that sending a matter of law to the jury
was not error because it ultimately "involves underlying questions of fact" and because "the formulation of issues is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court" (citations omitted)).

f 66 In their brief, defendants assert that "the district court erred when it denied summary judgment
and submitted to the jury, and did not set aside the
verdict on, Dr. Jensen's three alternative claims asserting an invasion of his privacy." By framing the
issue in this way, defendants invite us to consider
three separate occasions upon which the trial court
had an opportunity, and in defendants' view the obligation, to dispose of Dr. Jensen's intrusion on seclusion tort claim and its statutory companions. By
treating these events collectively, defendants imply
that the same standard of review applies to each.
According to defendants, that standard of review is
a nondeferential de novo reconsideration of the record. Defendants do not attempt to explain why de
novo review is uniformly applicable to a review of
rulings on summary judgment, directed verdict, and
the jury's verdict itself, nor do they cite any authority in support of this proposition.

\ 68 Defendants insist that we conduct a freeranging review of the jury's verdict on these common law and statutory privacy claims because the
jury was called upon to apply an objective standard
in evaluating whether Dr. Jensen had a sufficiently
cognizable privacy interest. Without a legitimate
privacy interest, Dr. Jensen could not have established the first element of the tort of intrusion on
seclusion, which requires that a defendant "intrude
[ ] into a private place, or otherwise invadef ] a
private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about
his person or affairs." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652B, cmt c (1977). The absence of a legitimate privacy interest would also be fatal to Dr.
Jensen's statutory claims. Utah's privacy and communication abuse statute conditions actionable conduct on an invasion of a "private place" which is
defined as "a place where one may reasonably be
safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-401(1).

f 67 It is beyond the scope of this appeal and not
necessary to its outcome to note that different
standards of review apply to appeals from rulings
on motions for summary judgment, motions for a
directed verdict, and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Nor need we do more than observe that appellate review of trial court denials of
these motions are treated differently than review of
motions granted. We likewise decline to take up the
unbriefed question of whether it is appropriate to
consider an appeal of a motion for a directed verdict that was improperly denied, thereby allowing a
*339 matter of law to be submitted to a jury. See,
e.g., R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d
1506, 1515 (Fed.Cir.1984) (holding that it is

\ 69 Whether Dr. Jensen enjoyed an actionable privacy interest was to be evaluated objectively, measured by the expectation of a reasonable person. According to defendants, the jury's use of an objective
standard to assess privacy exposes this verdict to
more rigorous appellate scrutiny. We disagree.
[13] \ 70 The calculation of the proper measure of
discretion to parcel out to a jury has virtually nothing to do with the fact that an objective standard is
used to evaluate the presence or absence of a
plaintiffs privacy interest. One need look no further
than the law of negligence to confirm this point.
Like the entitlement to privacy, the presence or ab-
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sence of negligence is gauged objectively, measured by society's expectations for the behavior of
the mythical "reasonable person." In our state, like
virtually every other jurisdiction in our country, the
question of whether a defendant's conduct fell below a particular standard of care is one to be decided by the jury. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gribble, 30
Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432, 434 (1973) ("The rights
and duties of drivers approaching intersections are
questions dealing with the standard of conduct to be
expected of a reasonably prudent man and are peculiarly a matter for the jury."); Hone v. Mammoth
Mining Co., 27 Utah 168, 75 P. 381, 384 (1904)
(holding that questions of "ordinary care" are subject to different interpretations and are therefore appropriate matters for a jury).
f 71 Despite the fact that the application of objective legal standards has long been counted among
the jury's tasks, defendants' assertion that an objective standard and nondeferential review are somehow connected is not farfetched. Indeed, the two
concepts are linked to one another in a manner that
becomes clear when they are viewed through the
lens of the law versus fact standard of review assessment model. This model, which we explored in
exacting detail in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah
1994), is the source in our case law of the often invoked "pasture fence" metaphor. See, e.g., State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, U 13, 103 P.3d 699; Alta Pac.
Assocs. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d 103,
109 (Utah 1997); State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278,
282 (Utah 1994).
% 72 In the bipolar law versus fact world, objective
standards appear to display the attributes of legal
constructs that are subject to unconstrained appellate review. It is not readily apparent, therefore,
why a jury's application of an objective standard in
its deliberations should mandate deferential appellate review.
% 73 Judge Learned Hand confronted this paradox
when attempting to explain why the objectively

evaluated question of negligence is submitted to the
jury. He wrote: "[I]n cases tried to a jury it is indeed treated [as a question of fact], although obviously it is not a question of fact, for it measures the
duty and liability which the law imposes." *34QSidney Blumenthal & Co. v. Atl. Coastline Rail Co.,
139 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir.1943), cert, denied, 321
U.S. 795, 64 S.Ct. 848, 88 L.Ed. 1084 (1944). The
complicating truth at the heart of Judge Hand's observation is that even matters that would be traditionally understood as legal issues will be treated as
questions of fact when presented to a jury.
% 74 To the extent that Pena describes a twodimensional standard of review universe that can be
navigated using the coordinates of law and fact, the
treatment of objective standards in jury trials exposes its limitations. 869 P.2d at 939. Settling on a
proper standard of review is about more than discriminating fact from law. Such a two-dimensional
interpretation does not account for other important
review considerations which lend breadth and depth
to the review selection enterprise.
1 75 A comparison of Pena with this case illustrates
the point. At issue in Pena was the proper standard
by which to review a trial court's determination of
whether a police stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion. 869 P.2d at 934-35. The issue presented
a classic mixed question of law and fact. Id. The
circumstances surrounding Mr. Pena's detention
were factual. Id. The concept of reasonable suspicion was legal. Id. The application of the reasonable suspicion standard to the circumstances of Mr.
Pena's detention intertwined both elements. Id. at
936.
% 16 The focus of our inquiry in Pena was where to
place the reasonable suspicion inquiry on the fact
versus law continuum. Id. at 939. Here, however,
we are reviewing a jury verdict. This enterprise
does not lend itself to the task of measuring the ratio of law to fact, positioning the result along a linear scale, and applying the measure of discretion
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assigned to that particular point. Instead, a jury verdict, even a special verdict that incorporates a jury's
answers to detailed components of a claim, will seldom lend itself to a Pena-like analysis because the
variety of options for the application of discretion
is not available when reviewing a jury verdict.
Rather, once it is determined that a matter has been
properly submitted to the jury, the question on review almost inevitably becomes the factual one of
whether there was substantial evidence to support
the outcome.
1 77 Defendants' argument is more accurately understood as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. In other words, defendants contend that
Dr. Jensen presented insufficient evidence-evidence
that fell short of the substantial evidence standard
necessary to support a jury verdict-to meet the
proper legal standard for an environment into which
an intrusion would be actionable. According to defendants, the uncontroverted facts established that
the clinic was open to the public and that Dr.
Jensen and Ms. Sawyers occupied the examination
room in a professional, rather than private, capacity.
[14] f 78 Defendants can certainly point to cases
which have attempted to set up identifiable landmarks to mark the boundaries of a private environment which should be legally protected from intrusion. For example, subject to certain limitations, the
work place enjoys lesser privacy protections than a
dwelling. See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 20
Cal.4th 907, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67, 74
(1999) (holding that "an employee may, under
some circumstances, have a reasonable expectation
of visual or aural privacy against electronic intrusion by a stranger, despite the possibility that the
conversations and interactions at issue could be
witnessed by coworkers or the employer"); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F.Supp. 925, 926-31
(C.D.Cal.1968), affd, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir.1971)
(The plaintiff was engaged in practicing simple
quackery out of his home. Reporters from Life

Magazine met with the plaintiff at his home and obtained pictures under the guise that they were referred to him by a friend. Instead the reporters
worked with the Los Angeles District Attorney's office to get information about the plaintiffs practice
and take pictures, which led to his arrest. The reporters also used a hidden radio transmitter to transmit the dialogue to a van. The pictures and a story
about the plaintiff were subsequently published in
Life Magazine. The Ninth Circuit held that this constituted an invasion of the plaintiffs privacy, writing, "It can hardly be concluded that plaintiffs
activities in his house, whether in the presence of
one or *341 several people, are activities in the
public view for the purpose of publication."). At the
same time, as the Sanders court noted, the concept
of privacy "is not a binary all or nothing characteristic." Sanders, 978 P.2d at 72.
[15] t 79 We agree with the Sanders court that
whether a person is entitled to solitude of seclusion
is a relative and highly fact-dependent matter. The
plastic nature of privacy is not at odds with the use
of an objective standard to evaluate its existence.
Rather, it is a recognition that reasonable people
may find a legally protectable private environment
in a multiple and varied array of physical settings.
f 80 We should be wary of using our appellate authority to attempt on a case-by-case basis to define
with precision the boundaries of a reasonable
sphere of protected privacy. Such an undertaking
carries with it the risk of creating more problems
than it would solve.
^[81 Justice Zimmerman, in Pena, recounted an example of the dangers of being overly eager to put
too high a polish on fact-dependent legal doctrines,
citing our experience with the law of waiver. 869
P.2d at 938. As Justice Zimmerman explained:
In a series of earlier cases, we have ruled that
waiver was or was not present as a matter of law
on the specific facts of those cases. This entailed
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fairly close scrutiny of the application of the general stated waiver principles to particular fact
situations. In the course of those decisions, we attempted to incorporate into the statement of the
law of waiver those facts that led us to decide
each of those cases as we did. Over time, we appear to have developed hopelessly inconsistent
elaborations on the basic statement of waiver
principles.
Id. (citation omitted).
% 82 Justice Zimmerman went on to note that this
court worked its way out of this difficulty when it
stripped the statement of the law back to its most
basic form and told the trial courts to apply it.
The net affect was to say that waiver is a highly
fact-dependent question, one that we cannot
properly review de novo in every case because
we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement
of the law through a course of such decisions.
Id. (citation omitted).
f 83 We conclude that there is much to be learned
from our experience with the law of waiver in approaching a legal definition of privacy. The jury instruction concerning privacy, to which defendants
did not object, presented the jury with a definition
of privacy in a basic form. Hewing closely to a general definition of privacy set out by our court of appeals in Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc.,
944 P.2d 374, 378 (Utah Ct.App.1997), the instruction stated:
With respect to the first element, plaintiff must
prove an intentional and substantial intrusion
upon his solitude or seclusion.

There are two forms of intrusion. The first form
is an intrusion upon a person's physical solitude
or seclusion. The second form does not require a

physical intrusion, but does require a prying or
intrusion into one's private affairs, such as eavesdropping on private conversations, peering into
one's home through the windows, or opening and
reading personal mail.
Id.
1f 84 Defendants' failure to object to this instruction
is reason enough to decline an extension or exploration of the contours of tort privacy. We would be
unlikely to do so anyway in light of our belief that
the facts to which a definition of actionable privacy
would be applied are so complex and varying that
no rule could be articulated that would anticipate all
of them. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939.
f 85 Defendants have assumed a substantial risk by
insisting that the jury verdict on the intrusion upon
seclusion and statutory claims are subject to de
novo review. That risk bears on yet another recurring theme in this appeal-marshaling. We have described this obligation as a defendant's burden to
"ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and become
a "devil's advocate." State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, f
28, 108 P.3d 710 (citations omitted).
*342 [16] f 86 Although we have not so expressly
held, the rationale for the duty to marshal evidence
has substantially less force in the context of de
novo review. Where an appellate court is obligated
to review the entire record anew, little is to be
gained by requiring an appellant to play the role of
devil's advocate and set up the opponent's case in
its best light. Having unsuccessfully persuaded us
to conduct a de novo review of this portion of the
jury's adverse verdict, however, defendants are not
excused from their obligation to marshal evidence.
f 87 Moreover, we decline to conduct a review
based on a traditional challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence. We do so not only because defendants have failed to marshal the evidence, but because they have failed to preserve, through a chal-
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lenge to jury instructions, the legal standard against
which the jury tested its facts. Stated simply, we
decline to conclude that it was unreasonable for the
jury to determine that the falsely represented presence of Ms. Sawyers in Dr. Jensen's examination
room deprived that environment of the privacy
status it almost certainly held if Dr. Jensen were to
have occupied the room alone.
f 88 We therefore affirm the jury's verdict on this
issue.
IV. DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE ON THEIR CLAIM THAT THE
THIRD BROADCAST WAS SUBSTANTIALLY
TRUE
[17] f 89 Defendants challenge the jury verdict
awarding Dr. Jensen damages on his defamation
and false light invasion of privacy causes of action
on the grounds that the content of the third broadcast was "substantially true." That statements which
may be infected with inaccuracy, innuendo, and
outright falsity and still not be actionable so long as
their "gist" or "sting" rings true is but one of countless ways the law defers to the commanding presence of free expression among our liberties. Defendants concede that certain statements made in
the third broadcast were not "literally" true. For example, Ms. Sawyers' use of the word "promise" to
describe Dr. Jensen's commitment to prescribe
Dexedrine for her was not uttered when he said, "If
Fastin didn't work for you, I'd be willing to work
with you, uh, maybe using Dexedrine. It's technically not legal for that reason."
% 90 Once again, the selection of the appropriate
standard of review is critical to the outcome of this
issue. Citing United States Supreme Court cases as
authority, defendants urge us to review the record
de novo and to reach our independent judgment
whether the content of the third broadcast was substantially true. We decline this invitation because it

would require us to apply the wrong standard of review.
[18] f 91 Appellate review of a jury verdict or
bench ruling in which freedom of expression is at
issue stands as an exception to traditional protection afforded jury verdicts from appellate review.
That a ruling is found to involve "constitutional
facts" and merit application of a "constitutional
rule" is an indication that much is at stake. This is
certainly true in the case of libel. A finding that a
libelous statement was made with actual malice sufficient to permit recovery under New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281-82, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11
L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), is not reviewed with the same
deference to the finder of that fact that would be extended to a finding of mens rea in other settings. Instead, where the First Amendment is implicated, the
"actual malice" finding acquires the status of a
"constitutional fact" requiring an appellate court to
conduct an "independent examination of the whole
record" to test its worthiness. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
499, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984); HarteHanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491
U.S. 657, 685-90, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562
(1989) (extending the Bose ruling to jury trials).
f 92 The Bose Court reasoned that the assessment
of whether a determination that a defamatory statement was animated by actual malice was one that
intermingled fact with law-and not just any law, but
one that implicates a "constitutional rule." 466 U.S.
at 509, 104 S.Ct. 1949. A statement that earned the
label of libelous thereby joined obscenity, fighting
words, incitement to riot, *343 and child pornography as a category of unprotected speech banished from the protective embrace of the First
Amendment. Because, however, the risk that any
particular statement might be consigned to an unprotected category by a judge or jury insufficiently
attentive to the First Amendment's broad protection
of even offensive, caustic, and inaccurate statements, an appellate court is duty bound to act in its
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role as the guardian of constitutional protections to
undertake searching appellate review of judgments
affecting speech.
H 93 Justice Harlan aptly made this point when he
noted in the context of obscenity:
The Court seems to assume that "obscenity" is a peculiar genus of "speech and press," which is as
distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison
ivy is among other plants. On this basis the constitutional question before us simply becomes, as
the Court says, whether "obscenity," as an abstraction, is protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and the question whether a particular book may be suppressed becomes a mere matter of classification, of "fact," to be entrusted to a
factfinder and insulated from independent constitutional judgment. But surely the problem cannot
be solved in such a generalized fashion. Every
communication has an individuality and "value"
of its own. The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of expression is, therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of
things every such suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in which a reviewing
court must determine for itself whether the attacked expression is [suppressible] within constitutional standards. Since those standards do not
readily lend themselves to generalized definitions, the constitutional problem in the last analysis becomes one of particularized judgments
which appellate courts must make for themselves.
I do not think that reviewing courts can escape
this responsibility by saying that the trier of facts,
be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the questioned
matter as "obscene," for, if "obscenity" is to be
suppressed, the question whether a particular
work is of that character involves not really an issue of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497-98, 77

S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (emphasis in
original).
f 94 In Bose, the United States Supreme Court
reasoned that although the determination of whether a defendant acted with the malice necessary to
sustain a libel action displayed the hallmarks of a
finding of fact, it nevertheless required the independent appellate review advocated by Justice Harlan. F N 1 ! 466 U.S. at 507 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 1949.
FN11. Justice Stevens' majority opinion in
Bose took care to note that the labor required to perform an independent examination of the record was less taxing than that
required of a Court conducting de novo review. 466 U.S. at 492, 104 S.Ct. 1949. The
independent examination contemplated by
the Bose court was limited to the portions
of the record relevant to the issue subject
to independent review. Such a review was,
in the view of the Bose majority, appreciably different from the review of the entire judgment which is the typical scope of
work for a reviewing court conducting de
novo review. Id. at 514 n. 31, 104 S.Ct.
1949. The Bose dissenters were apparently
unimpressed with this distinction. They
uniformly described the undertaking required by the majority as de novo review.
Id.
% 95 Here, we are faced with the question of whether the review of substantial truth shares sufficient
features with the review of actual malice so that it,
too, must be treated as a constitutional fact and given more rigorous appellate scrutiny. We conclude
that it does not.
[19][20] f % Unlike actual malice, obscenity, and
other "constitutional facts," the act of assessing
whether an allegedly defamatory statement is substantially true does not require the finder of fact to
apply a constitutional standard to a particular set of
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facts.
*344 The task of gauging the overall
thrust of an allegedly defamatory statement against
the accuracy of its component parts is not one that
demands the exercise of constitutional judgment.
Instead, determining whether an allegedly defamatory statement is substantially true calls upon finders
of fact to engage in the work for which they are
best suited, the discovery of truth through the application of their judgment, life experience, and
common sense. Therefore, we review the issue of
whether defendants' statements were substantially
true as a traditional question of fact. We will set
aside the jury verdict, which was based in part on
the finding that defendants' statements were not
substantially true only if there exists no substantial
FN 13
evidence to support it.
FN 12. This is not to say that the defense of
substantial truth has no constitutional dimension. A definition of defamation that
would expose a person to liability for any
statement that fell short of absolute, literal
truth would likely violate the First Amendment. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 289, 84
S.Ct. 710; Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 508-11,111
S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991).
FN13. Defendants also claim that we
should evaluate the issue of substantial
truth for correctness because they raised
the issues in motions for summary judgment and for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Defendants have not briefed these
novel contentions, and we decline, in the
absence of analysis, to consider them.
f 97 As a consequence of our holding that the defense of substantial truth presents a question of fact,
defendants assume the obligation to marshal evidence.
f 98 Defendants have failed to satisfy their duty to
marshal. The approach taken by defendants on the

issue of substantial truth in their reply brief highlights this shortcoming. The section of their brief
addressing substantial truth is titled "Dr. Jensen has
failed to demonstrate that the defendants' published
statements are not substantially true." Not only
does this statement suggest incorrectly that the burden to prove this defense fell to Dr. Jensen, but it
also conveys the erroneous notion that Dr. Jensen
had the duty to present evidence from the record
sufficient to carry his burden on appeal. Neither
proposition is true. We conclude that in the absence
of any meaningful marshaling, defendants have forfeited a claim to our substantial evidence review of
the defense of substantial truth.
V. ECONOMIC DAMAGES FLOWING FROM
THE THIRD BROADCAST
% 99 Defendants argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's $1 million damages
award to Dr. Jensen for economic losses caused by
the third broadcast. They insist that the award was
error because Dr. Jensen proffered no evidence that
he suffered any economic loss that could be linked
to the third broadcast. All evidence relating to any
economic loss, most significantly evidence that Dr.
Jensen was stripped of his medical privileges and
suffered a reduction in work hours, concerned
events that took place more than a year before the
third broadcast. We again begin our assessment of
this issue by setting out the standard of review and
proof needed to sustain a jury verdict for damages.
[21][22] t 100 We will disturb a jury verdict challenged for lack of evidence only if we conclude that
the quantity and quality of the evidence fall short of
"substantial." Where evidence may be susceptible
to multiple interpretations, some tending to support
the verdict, others pointing to an ill-advised result,
we will indulge only those reasonable inferences favorable to the verdict. Water Energy Sys. Tech.,
Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32,ffl[2, 15, 48 P.3d 888.
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f 101 On this issue, defendants yet again display a
less than zealous commitment to the duty to marshal evidence. Defendants attempt to justify
sidestepping the marshaling requirement by insisting that there is no evidence on the record to marshal. This tactic of marshaling avoidance is fraught
with peril. In most instances, this ploy amounts to
nothing more than an attempt to shift the burden of
satisfying the sufficiency test to the appellee in a
format that postpones any meaningful engagement
of the sufficiency issue to the appellees' brief. This
turns marshaling on its head.
K 102 At the conclusion of every lawsuit that has
survived trial and post-trial motions, the winning
party, the trial judge, and the jury had reason to believe that there was some evidence presented to validate the outcome. In bench trials, this evidence is
reflected in the court's findings of fact. In jury trials, it can be expected to be highlighted in closing
arguments and in arguments offered *345 in opposition to directed verdicts and post-trial motions.
Usually advocates can be counted on to put their
best facts on display in these settings. They therefore offer reliable resources to parties who face a
marshaling burden on appeal.
f 103 Our commitment to the marshaling requirement is unyielding. Moreover, we disapprove of attempts to evade the responsibility to marshal. These
expressions of resolve notwithstanding, we agree
with defendants that the record contains no discernible evidence linking economic loss to the third
broadcast.
f 104 This is not to say that the record is devoid of
evidence that any of the broadcasts had negative
economic effects for Dr. Jensen. It is not. But the
jury was asked to separately address economic loss
traceable to the third broadcast, and it is this evidence that cannot be accounted for. Indeed we are
unable to uncover, even in the likely locations identified above, any credible assignment of economic
loss to the third broadcast.

% 105 In reaching this conclusion, we paid particular attention to the testimony of Dr. Jensen and Mr.
Frank Stuart, Dr. Jensen's expert witness on economic damages. We canvassed Dr. Jensen's responses to defendants' motions for directed verdict,
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial,
and to alter or amend the judgment. We examined
the closing arguments of all parties. We inspected
Dr. Jensen's exhibits graphing his income trends.
None of these quests yielded evidence of economic
loss tied to the third broadcast.
% 106 We will describe our review of the record
more fully.
A. Plaintiffs Responses to Defendants' Motions
[23] % 107 Dr. Jensen met defendants' motions challenging the adequacy of his economic loss evidence
related to the third broadcast by noting that "Dr.
Jensen testified at length regarding the patients who
refused to see him, lost hospital privileges, and the
cut in his hours which resulted in his need to leave
the Art City Medical Clinic in search of work elsewhere, namely nursing homes," and "[tjhese damages occurred after the November broadcast." He
argued that as a result of the third broadcast, "now
he works in nursing homes billing Medicare and
Medicaid, working longer hours, and being confronted with death everyday." However, the record
does not support these assertions. Instead, the testimony cited by Dr. Jensen's counsel fails to link
these economic events to the third broadcast.
Moreover in his response to defendants' motion for
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Dr. Jensen
argues that "Media Defendants misstate that Dr.
Jensen's entire damage theory was based on his removal from IHC physicians' panel." Yet nowhere in
this motion does Dr. Jensen demonstrate any tie
between the third broadcast and economic damages.
U 108 Dr. Jensen also contends that economic losses
were limited to the third broadcast through the testi-
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mony of Mr. Stuart that "because Dr. Jensen was
forced into nursing home practice, he is currently
making less money than he would have been making if he were still in private practice." Yet Dr.
Jensen likened his move from private practice to
nursing homes to his loss of IHC privileges after
the first broadcast. It is true that Dr. Jensen left his
position at the Art City Clinic after the third broadcast. However, he was not terminated from that position. Instead, when his hours were decreased at
the clinic-possibly as a result of the third broadcastDr. Jensen voluntarily left the clinic and sought
work in the nursing home field.
B. Plaintiff's Testimony and Exhibits
f 109 Dr. Jensen admitted that the greatest blow to
his income was caused by loss of IHC privileges a
year before the third stoiy aired. On appeal, Dr.
Jensen attempts to redirect the source of his economic misfortune to the third broadcast. Dr. Jensen
argues that the third broadcast made inevitable his
termination from the Art City Clinic. Seeing his involuntary separation from the clinic coming, Dr.
Jensen resigned to take a less desirable and lower
paying nursing home practice.
K 110 However, the record does not support Dr.
Jensen's perceived attempt to link his demotion to
nursing home practice to the *346 third broadcast.
The record shows that Dr. Jensen was told after the
third broadcast that if another story aired he could
be fired from the Art City Clinic.
f i l l Tellingly, Dr. Jensen's exhibits do not reflect
economic damage from leaving Art City and moving to nursing home work. According to his exhibits, Dr. Jensen made $127,606 in 1996, the year of
the third broadcast. His income increased by sixtythree dollars in 1997. His exhibits also graph a
forty-thousand dollar increase in revenue between
1996 and 1999.
% 112 Accordingly, plaintiffs testimony and exhib-

its do not offer substantial evidence to support the
$1 million verdict for economic loss related to the
third broadcast.
C. Dr. Jensen's Closing Argument
f 113 We next turn our attention to yet another resource which could reasonably be counted on to
provide clues about the evidentiary basis for Dr.
Jensen's claim of economic loss, his closing argument to the jury. Our review of the closing arguments uncovered no reference to evidence that
might support a finding of damages for the third
broadcast. Instead, Dr. Jensen's counsel argued that
"as a result of the [first] newscast Dr. Jensen was
fired from FirstMed," causing Dr. Jensen damage.
Counsel also told the jury that as a result of the first
broadcast Dr. Jensen no longer had IHC privileges.
Counsel then stated that his experts demonstrated a
"substantial drop in gross income during 1995" and
that it takes more work to earn the same amount of
money in nursing homes, but he articulates no link
anywhere between the third broadcast and the damage. This is because all the experts and damage figures relate to Dr. Jensen's removal from the IHC
panel, which took place in 1995. No figures were
tied directly to the third broadcast, which is the
only broadcast we review. The record confirms this
characterization of the evidence.
D. Dr. Jensen's Argument on Appeal
% 114 On appeal, Dr. Jensen mounts a threepronged attack in support of the jury's economic
damages attributed to the third broadcast. He first
argues that we cannot disturb the findings of the
jury because this court must defer to a jury's findings. He also insists that because the trial court
denied motions for new trial or reduction or vacation of the award, this represents "further solidarity
of the judgment." We disagree. As explained earlier, our jurisprudence gives appellate courts the right
to vacate a jury verdict for insufficient evidence if,
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upon review, we are unable to identify substantial
evidence in support of the finding. As we have detailed, that is the case here.
f 115 Second, Dr. Jensen argues that defendants
failed to marshal the evidence and merely pay "lip
service to this obligation." As we addressed above,
we reject this attempt to transfer the burden to defendants, which cannot be met because there is, in
fact, no discrete evidence to support an award of
damages on the third broadcast.
f 116 Finally, Dr. Jensen acknowledges that "in
presenting damage calculations at trial, [his] experts did not compartmentalize the damages by
broadcast." He argues this was not necessary because the jury heard the evidence and apportioning
the awards by broadcast was properly left to the
discretion of the jury. The structure of the jury verdict undercuts this assertion. The jury was presented with a separate verdict form concerning economic damages attributable to the third broadcast.
Its award must be supported by substantial evidence
that meets the requirements of the verdict. The record does not contain that evidence. Therefore, we
vacate the award.
VI. AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR ACTUAL MALICE
IN THE THIRD BROADCAST
% 117 The last issue defendants ask us to review is
their contention that the jury erred in awarding Dr.
Jensen punitive damages on the defamation and
false light claims relating to the third broadcast.
Defendants argue that there was not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice and, therefore,
punitive damages were improperly awarded. In
spite of our impression that the third broadcast*347
was likely the least defensible of the three, we conclude that its content does not reveal actual malice
and therefore vacate the award of punitive dam-

ages.
K 118 In reaching this conclusion, we conduct a
nondeferential independent review of the record.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 104
S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). Although Bose
did not concern a challenge to punitive damages,
this distinction does not distort the suitability of its
fit to this case. At the core of both cases is the question of the proper standard of review to be applied
to outcomes based on findings of actual malice concerning statements that enjoyed a colorable claim to
First Amendment protection. We therefore follow
the prescription for independent review of the record that the content of the third broadcast was
made by defendants with "actual malice." Id. at
498-502, 104 S.Ct. 1949.
[24] f 119 Statements of actual malice are those
made "with knowledge that [they] were false or
[made] with reckless disregard of whether [they]
were false or not." Id.
A. The Third Broadcast
f 120 In the third broadcast, Ms. Sawyers targeted
"questionable doctors" such as those who were
"passing out drugs to addicts or worse yet, sexually
abusing ... patients." She told viewers they could
find out which "questionable doctors" were practicing medicine in Utah by reading a Washington
watchdog publication, "Questionable Doctors." As
part of this report, she asked viewers, "And what
about Dr. Michael Jensen? In July 1995 we caught
him on camera promising me illegal drugs for
weight loss." The report then showed Dr. Jensen
telling Ms. Sawyers that "[i]f Fastin didn't work for
you, I'd be willing to work with you, uh, maybe using Dexedrine. It's technically not legal for that
reason." Ms. Sawyers then informed viewers that
"[t]he State filed an action against Jensen last June.
But again, the case is in the hands of lawyers and
Dr. Jensen is still practicing." She provided a
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"postscript" to viewers, telling them that
[y]esterday we got word that action has now been
taken against Dr. Michael Jensen. He's the one
we caught on tape promising me illegal drugs.
The state will allow Jensen to keep his license but
hell receive a public reprimand which requires
him to attend a workshop on proper prescribing
and a course on medical ethics.
B. Application of the Actual Malice Standard to the
Third Broadcast
[25] f 121 The centerpiece of Dr. Jensen's claim of
actual malice is Ms. Sawyers' statement that he
"promised" her illegal drugs. There is no doubt that
Dr. Jensen offered to "work with her" in illegally
prescribing Dexedrine to her, but this, as we have
stated earlier, may not constitute a promise. Defendants concede the literal inaccuracy of the word
"promise." This misstatement connotes a more unequivocal willingness by Dr. Jensen to flout the law
governing prescription medicine. It does not,
however, leave us with the clear and convincing
impression that the accusatory distinction between
"promise" and "work with" is sufficient to establish
actual malice. It surely falls short of indicating personal malice rising to the level of hatred or ill-will
on the part of defendants against Dr. Jensen.
f 122 Our independent review of the testimony by
Ms. Sawyers and station manager John Edwards
persuades us that there is insufficient evidence from
which we could conclude they did not hold an honest belief that Dr. Jensen had offered or promised
her Dexedrine, which is illegal for use in weight
loss. The interaction between Ms. Sawyers and Dr.
Jensen does square with the Black's Law Dictionary
definition of promise-"The manifestation of an intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified
manner that another is justified in understanding
that a commitment has been made...." Blacks Law
Dictionary 1229 (7th ed.1999). It is clear that Dr.

Jensen manifested an intent or willingness to act in
a specific manner-to prescribe Dexedrine-although
it was not legal for weight loss purposes. Ms. Sawyers testified that she believed the content of the
third broadcast accurate or truthful because Dr.
Jensen had twice offered her Dexedrine and she had
confirmed with DOPL that prescribing*348 it was
illegal. Mr. Edwards testified similarly. Thus even
her most egregious misstatement does not rise to
the level of actual malice.
f 123 We do find the general tenor of the third
broadcast troubling. By aggregating within a broadcast the alleged misdeeds of several physicians, the
third broadcast had the presumably intended effect
of shifting focus from the misconduct and disciplinary fate of individual physicians to a more sensational suggestion that Utah was home to a band of
rogue doctors imperiling the health of its citizens.
This inference of a potentially malicious motive for
the third broadcast enjoys, however, no greater
claim to credibility than does Ms. Sawyers' explanation that the purpose of the third broadcast was not
to compare physicians and their offenses, but to
educate the viewers on how to research physicians
who might be under investigation.
f 124 The third broadcast focused on Utah physicians either in the "Questionable Doctors" book or,
as in the case of Dr. Jensen, a physician whose conduct fell under the rubric of questionable. Her focus
in the third broadcast was to "let the public know
about how they could find out about pending actions or actions that had already been taken against
physicians in this state." Ms. Sawyers acknowledged that she did not believe that Dr. Jensen's
conduct was as bad as the other physician she identified in the story, nor was he, at that time in
"Questionable Doctors." She explained that her
reason for including him in the broadcast was that
"[Dr. Jensen] was an example of a doctor who had
been investigated by the Division of Professional
Licensing." Investigations by DOPL into physician
conduct form the basis and content for editions of
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the book "Questionable Doctors." Ms. Sawyers added that even if she had learned of the resolution of
the DOPL charges against Dr. Jensen, she still
"would have said he is the one we caught on camera offering me illegal drugs" because she believed
this to be true. She also testified that the process of
editing and preparing the third broadcast was a
time-intensive and highly evaluative process which,
she insists supports her position that the content of
the broadcast and her conduct were not, nor would
have been, made with knowledge that the broadcast
was untruthful.
K 125 While clearly an aberration from "fair and
balanced" journalism, the content of the third
broadcast leaves us unconvinced that it was the
product of actual malice. We therefore vacate the
award of punitive damages on the third broadcast.

quotation marks and citations omitted). "The standard of review on appeal of [the amount of] a trial
court's award of attorney fees is patent error or
clear abuse of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald,
961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
B. Attorney Fees on Overlapping Claims
[30][31] f 128 We first address whether the trial
court erred by not awarding attorney fees on the
overlapping claims. In general, a prevailing party
may collect attorney fees on noncompensable
claims only if those claims substantially overlap
with compensable claims. *349Keith Jorgensen's,
Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, %
30, 26 P.3d 872.

VII. DR. JENSEN'S CROSS-APPEAL

% 129 The trial court properly concluded that Dr.
Jensen was not entitled to all attorney fees because

f 126 Dr. Jensen cross-appeals on the issue of fees.
He argues that the trial court should have awarded
him fees because his work on the claims substantially overlapped, because he did sufficiently allocate the fees between recoverable and nonrecoverable fees, and because Ms. Sawyers did not comply
with rule 54(d)(2). He also appeals the trial court's
reduction of damages because the awards were
based on duplicative claims. We affirm.

some of plaintiff s claims are based on the obtaining
of information, and other claims are based on the
broadcast of information, there is not a core of
facts common to all claims, and the legal theories
are unrelated. In this case, not only was some of
the time spent on unsuccessful issues, a large portion of time was spent establishing the noncompensable claims of defamation and false
light.

A. Standard of Review
[26][27][28][29] f 127 Attorney fees are awarded
only when authorized by statute or by contract. The
award of attorney fees is a matter of law, which we
review for correctness. Paul DeGroot Bldg. Servs.,
L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, H 18, 112 P.3d
490. However, a trial court has "broad discretion in
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and
we will consider that determination against an abuse-of-discretion standard." Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988) (internal

f 130 On appeal, Dr. Jensen's counsel merely argues that "[although Dr. Jensen's claims can
loosely be categorized as gathering of information
claims and broadcast claims, that does not mean
that the claims do not overlap." Not only is this argument conclusory, it fails to convince us, or
provide us sufficient evidence, to overcome the applicable standard of review. Moreover, we agree
with the trial court that the invasion of privacy
claims based on newsgathering are not
"inextricably linked" with, and require different
proof than, the defamation and false light claims
based on the broadcasts. We therefore defer to the
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trial court's evaluation of the evidence and documentation submitted on the overlapping claims, and
affirm.
C. Attorney Fees Due to Defective Allocation Documentation
[32] f 131 The second issue on cross-appeal-the issue of attorney fees for compensable and noncompensable claims-was meticulously addressed in two
of the trial court's rulings. In July 2001, the court
notified Dr. Jensen that his claims had failed to adequately apportion between compensable (i.e., Title
76 and common law intrusion upon seclusion
claims), and noncompensable claims. The court invited plaintiffs counsel to supplement their affidavits by separating out the work into three categories: (1) work that pertains specifically to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-9-401 to -406; (2) work that specifically pertains to common law intrusion upon seclusion; and (3) work on any other claim. With regard to fees of mixed character, plaintiff was to
break out (1) what percentage of each billing entry
went to support common law intrusion upon seclusion claims, and (2) what percentage went to support Title 76 claims. All other work was deemed to
have been done on noncompensable claims. The
court stated that failure to adequately separate noncompensable and compensable claims may result in
denial of any other fees for the commingled entry.
[33] % 132 In the trial court's second ruling on this
matter, it correctly explained that for it to award attorney fees, it must first review all the evidence and
make specific findings of fact. Further, the party requesting the attorney fees must
categorize the time and fees expended for "(1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for
which there may be an entitlement to attorney
fees had the claims been successful, and (3)
claims for which there is no entitlement to attor-

ney fees."
Foote v. Clarkf 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998)
(quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d
266, 268 (Utah 1992)). Noncompliance with these
requirements makes it difficult, if not impossible,
for the trial court to award the moving party fees
because there is insufficient evidence to support the
award.
f 133 The trial court noted the extensive work and
research conducted in preparation for this case. The
court also acknowledged that the attorneys' affidavits did reflect the amount of work necessary to
mount the case. The court found that Attorney
Gardiner adequately, but not exactly, complied with
the attorney fees documenting his time spent on
compensable claims. However, Attorney Sine did
not. Mr. Sine told the court it was "impossible" for
him to separate his time and merely separated the
time into two columns-one compensable and the
other noncompensable. As a result, the trial court
found it had previously warned counsel in the July
order of the importance of adequate separation of
the claims, yet again "Mr. Sine did not give [the
court] sufficient evidence to determine how much
time he spent on compensable claims and because
the amount of *3§0 time he claimed to have spent
on the compensable claims is unreasonable, this
[c]ourt cannot make an appropriate evaluation."
f 134 Mr. Sine presents one sentence for our consideration of his argument on appeal. He writes: "If
the court closely examines Attorney Sine's submissions, it will see the criteria for fees was met." This
is inadequate and does not provide sufficient legal
reason for us to override the discretion of the trial
court which had the ability to twice review the documentation on this issue. Affirmed.
D. Dr. Jensen's Application for Award of All
Claimed Costs
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1. Ms. Sawyers complied with rule 54(d)(2)
t 135 Dr. Jensen also argues that all of his claimed
costs should have been awarded because Ms. Sawyers failed to comply with rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(d)(2) states:
The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of the judgment serve upon
the adverse party against whom costs are
claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of
his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum
thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the
action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with
the costs claimed may, within seven days after
service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the
service and filing of the finding of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment,
shall nevertheless be considered as served and
filed on the date judgment is entered.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2).
[34] % 136 The sum total of Dr. Jensen's argument
is that his timely filed motion of dissatisfaction
with the court seeking costs in the amount of
$122,952.66 should have been granted because Ms.
Sawyers filed an objection, rather than a motion,
opposing those costs. He cites no authority for support.
f 137 Ms. Sawyers contends that the words
"motion" and "objection" are interchangeable and
therefore she properly complied with rule 54(d)(2).
For support, she cites two rule 54(d)(2) cases,
Graco Fishing & Rental Tools v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988), and
Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847, 849

(Utah 1978), which specifically identify the filing
of an "objection" rather than a "motion" to convey
the dissatisfaction with the proposed distribution of
cost awards.
f 138 We agree with Ms. Sawyers that motion and
objection are interchangeable in this case. Black's
Law Dictionary defines a motion as a "written or
oral application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or order." 1031 (7th ed.1999). An objection is defined as a "formal statement opposing
something that has occurred, or is about to occur, in
court." Id. at 1101. In this case, having reviewed
Ms. Sawyers' objection to the memorandum of verified costs which follows the same framework as a
motion, we conclude that the distinction Dr. Jensen
asks us to make is too narrow and violates the intent and spirit of rule 54(d)(2). We affirm the trial
court's finding that Ms. Sawyers complied sufficiently with rule 54(d)(2).
2. Dr. Jensen's claimed costs were not "Necessary
Disbursements"
[35] f 139 Dr. Jensen appeals the trial court's denial
of his application for costs for "necessary disbursements" authorized under rule 54(d)(2) and associated with his claim for transcript costs, expert witness fees, court equipment expenses, and other outof-pocket costs. Dr. Jensen claims that the trial
court erred by too strictly applying the rule we set
out in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah
1980). The trial court supported its position by
writing that "the Utah Supreme Court has stated
that 'there is a distinction to be understood'
between legitimate and taxable costs and other expenses of litigation which may ever be so necessary, but are not taxable as costs" (citing Frampton,
605 P.2d at 774). Dr. Jensen argues that we should
reverse or modify the Frampton rule because*351
rule 54(d)(2) does not distinguish between taxable
costs and litigation expenses and because the
Frampton rule omits the "necessary disbursements"
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language in rule 54(d)(2). We disagree.
[36] U 140 We again reference the appropriate
standard of review for costs under rule 54(d)(2). "A
trial court's decision to award the prevailing party
its costs will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, f 4, 16
P.3d 549. Moreover, in Frampton we instructed that
the trial court has a "duty to guard against excesses
or abuses" in awarding costs. 605 P.2d at 773.
f 141 The trial court's order on this issue carefully
reviewed this court's body of law on necessary disbursements and costs. The court makes clear that
many of Dr. Jensen's proposed costs violate the
Frampton rule against unnecessary costs. Specifically, the court found that some of the deposition
costs were not essential or Dr. Jensen could not
demonstrate that a less expensive means of obtaining the transcripts would not have been practical.
The court reminded the parties that "[c]osts
were not recoverable at common law; and are therefore generally allowable only in the amounts and in
the manner provided by statute." Frampton, 605
P.2d at 773. As a result, a number of items were
held unrecoverable by statute-those included a
video consultant and court equipment expenses.
FN 14. In Young, we determined that a successful plaintiff seeking costs must show
"the deposition was so essential to the case
... that the information provided by the deposition could not have been obtained
through less expensive means of discovery." 2000 UT 91, f 11, 16 P.3d 549.

for allocation of recoverable costs. The trial court
properly applied Frampton to the issue of recoverable costs. Dr. Jensen has failed to persuade us with
sufficient authority or evidence that we should
overrule Frampton and reject the guidelines established by the legislature for appropriate recoverable
costs. We therefore affirm.
CONCLUSION
f 143 Having held that Dr. Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claims arising from the first and
second broadcasts are subject to the statute of limitations governing defamation and therefore timebarred, we vacate the verdict and damages awards
based on that claim. Our holding that the jury improperly awarded economic loss and punitive damages to Dr. Jensen on his claims relating to the third
broadcast results in the modification of the damages
award to $500,000 subject to apportionment based
on the jury's allocation of fault.
% 144 Having affirmed the trial court on all other issues raised on appeal, the remaining elements of the
judgment are undisturbed.
f 145 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice
PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion.
Utah,2005.
Jensen v. Sawyers
130 P.3d 325, 33 Media L. Rep. 2578, 539 Utah
Adv. Rep. 6, 2005 UT 81
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f 142 Dr. Jensen tries to make a case for rejecting
Frampton, arguing that the question of necessary
costs should not be left entirely to the discretion of
the legislature and because it may violate the open
courts clause in the Utah Constitution by limiting
"recoverable costs to those conservatively specified
by the legislature." We disagree. For twenty-five
years, Frampton has remained our guiding principle
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